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1. Introduction
The last five years has for obvious reasons seen an upswing in the literature 
examining the causes of financial crises. During the period we have once again been 
reminded of how the failure of banks and financial systems can have devastating 
effects on lives throughout the global economy. Finding out why crises such as these 
happen, and how to prevent them, is one of many important questions waiting to be 
answered in the field of economics. This thesis humbly seeks to make a contribution 
towards performing this paramount task.
The literature has come to agree on a narrative as to what happened in 
the financial melt-down of 2007-2008, but there is no clear consensus as to why it 
happened. This thesis will propose one possible explanation by combining two 
theoretical approaches; that of Minsky-bubbles and that of wealth hoarding. 
Through doing this it will argue that many of the mechanisms commonly assumed 
to influence banking crises are linked to inequality, or more specifically to the 
concentration of financial wealth, and that wealth concentration thus might be one 
of the main drivers of systemic banking crises in a "very macro perspective". It will 
begin by going through some selected theoretical works, before formulating the 
Minsky-hoarder nexus. It will continue to give a simple theoretical model showing 
how the Minsky-hoarder nexus can cause a banking crisis, before it goes on to an 
empirical analysis to shed light on the relationship between inequality and banking 
crises during the last 20-40 years. Through applying a multivariate logit approach, it 
shows that income inequality seems to be one of the factors positively influencing 
the probability of suffering a systemic banking crisis. The result is robust and 
consistent through a number of specifications, even as most other explanatory 
variables loose significance. We thereby conclude that reducing inequality is not 
only an obvious goal for moral reasons, but also an important policy measure 
towards increasing financial stability. 
2. Theoretical Causes of Systemic Banking Crises
In this section of the thesis we will summarize the theoretical causes of systemic 
banking crises (hereafter SBCs) most commonly referred to in the literature. Extra 
weight will be given on the topic of financial bubbles, as this is where the thesis 
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seeks to make a contribution. The US “sub-prime” bubble which busted in 2007 will 
be referred to frequently. Even though the particulars of this bubble are not 
described here, we assume them to be well known to the reader. The frequent use of 
this crisis as an example is motivated by having a common reference upon to base 
arguments, and should not be taken as implying that this crisis is the main topic of 
concern; crises and bubbles in general are the main concerns of the text.
Before we start, some justification might however be in order. What 
will be summarized below are not detailed descriptions of the regulation of financial 
markets; we will not dig into legal frameworks, nor the corporate structure or 
cultural attributes of financial systems. Explanations disregarding such factors could 
very well be futile. As argued by Llewellyn (2002), the main causes of banking 
crises might be found within the banking sector itself, rather than in factors easily 
quantifiable and comparable between countries. However, as economists we seek to 
shed light on the quantifiable factors influencing economic activity, we search for 
explanations in the aggregate rather than the specific. To borrow a quote from the 
late Charles Kindleberger: "For historians each event is unique. Economics, 
however, maintains that forces in society and nature behave in repetitive ways. 
History is particular; economics is general." (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011, p.24, 
also quoted in Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). I agree with Kindleberger, and would 
be so bold as to say that what is interesting is not the specific, but the general. This 
is why we in the following will focus on just that.
2.1. Banks and Fragility
Banks supply credit, which in a sense means that they buy and sell money. However 
credit is not a good like all others, it is a very special type of good, and the normal 
supply and demand framework does not suit well for understanding it. The main 
difference is that the price for credit is not payed at the same time as it is transferred, 
it is payed over a time-span following the transfer - uncertainty and risk thus 
become important factors in the functioning of banks. Furthermore banks serve a 
very important role in the economy, diverting means to those who want it in the 
present from those who want it at a later point in time. Without this type of 
intermediating, the economy would function very differently. In other words; banks 
are a paramount part of the economy, all the while they are disproportionately 
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exposed to risk. This of course makes for a very interesting topic for economists, 
and the literature on the topic is as voluminous as can be expected. When the main 
factors believed to influence bank fragility are summarized below, some 
contributions are thereby necessarily left out, while others are extremely simplified. 
The selection is based on what variables will be included in the empirical part of 
this thesis, and on what will be important for the following theoretical discussion. I 
am however confident that the reader is well familiar with the workings of the 
banking system, and does not need to be explained the entire workings of the 
banking sector, if not I can recommend the concise survey from Allen & Carletti 
(2008).
Banks lend the money of depositors to borrowers (debtors). They 
promise to pay back the deposits plus an interest to the depositors, and they finance 
this by charging an interest rate on the debtor. However, banks can never know if 
the debtor is willing or able to repay the debt. In fact this is one of the reasons why 
banks arose; there are economies of scale in evaluating the risk of debtors. The 
depositors accept a lower rate of return on their money than what the debtors pay, in 
return for the banks taking the risk. The system works as long as this spread covers 
all losses from defaults. Problems arise if the banks misjudge the risk and are unable 
to repay their depositors based on what they receive by the debtors. Problems can 
also arise due to the temporal imbalance between the bank's liabilities (deposits) and 
assets (money owed by debtors). Where as depositors usually are free to withdraw 
their money at any point, debtors usually have a fixed down-payment plan. Thus, if 
a large portion depositors want to withdraw their money at the same time, the bank 
does not have the means to repay them. They are in other words reliant on 
withdrawals roughly equaling new deposits and down payments at any point in time. 
Thus the banking system is inherently unstable, and relies on everyone trusting the 
system for the system to work. (Levine, 1997)
This makes banks vulnerable to bank runs, either based on 
fundamentals, or simply self-fulfilling prophecies. The less money they keep liquid 
the more vulnerable they are. Banks are therefore often obliged by regulations to 
keep a percentage of total assets in government bonds. In addition governments 
often supply deposit insurance to depositors, meaning that they ensure the 
repayment of deposits below a certain limit to all depositors in the event of a bank 
failure. This on one hand lowers the risk of a bank-run, but on the other hand can 
increase the moral hazard of banks as depositors choosing banks based on their 
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soundness often is believed to be an important factor reducing bank risk (see 
Diamond & Dybvig, 1983).
As Stiglitz (1972) argues, moral hazard will however always be a 
problem in the banking sector, as potential gains for bank owners (if separate from 
depositors) always will be bigger than potential losses, which are limited to 
bankruptcy. This is especially true for high leverage levels, where potential gains 
can be astronomical. Accordingly, regulatory frameworks on leverage, on risk-
taking, and on criminal accountability, becomes important for stability.
Interest rates can also affect bank stability, especially if banks are 
dependent on interbank loans or loans from foreign sources, both of which often 
have interest rates that can vary independently of the rate they receive from debtors. 
Thus higher interest rates on money borrowed in the market entail higher losses for 
banks. This again is related to financial openness, as more financial openness 
increases the probability of foreign loans by banks and of high interest rates to fend 
off speculative attacks on the currency (especially with fixed exchange rates) 
(Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002). Financial openness also affects stability 
through larger probabilities of sudden out-flows of capital, especially if not backed 
by sufficient holdings of foreign currency by the central bank (see Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh & Taylor, 2008).
High interest rates are also potentially less stable than low interest 
rates even when considering equal rates on assets and liabilities. Very profitable 
projects are often risky, thus the debtors willing to pay a high interest rate are on 
average more risky than those willing to pay a low one. Under asymmetric 
information, this entails higher risk for the banks. (Mishkin, 1991)
Bank concentration, meaning the number of banks in an economy can 
also have effects on stability. Large banks (relative to the economy) might be more 
inefficient than smaller banks due to dis-economies to scale, and more prone to risk 
than smaller banks due to being more sure of a bail-out in the case of insolvency.  
On the flip-side, there might be economies of scale in banking, rather than dis-
economies, and large banks might have larger profits and thus be less prone to risk 
(at the fear of loosing future profit). (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2000)
These are some of the basic attributes of banks that influence their 
fragility. Later we will see how variations in these attributes are found to influence 
the probability of suffering an SBC in the empirical literature, but first we need to 
see just what constitutes an SBC. 
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The failure of one bank can, and often does, cause other banks to fail, 
especially if the banks in the system are fragile at the point. This can happen through 
decreased trust in the system causing either withdrawals, higher prices for interbank 
credit, higher default rates due to lower profitability in the economy, all at once, or 
general liquidity shortages (Diamond & Rajan, 2005). When many banks fail at the 
same time, we conclude that something was wrong with the system, not just the 
banks, and that's why we call such incidents systemic banking crises1 (SBCs).
The factors mentioned above all influence the stability of the banking 
sector. The primary channel through which they do this is by influencing to what 
degree the banking sector can handle unpredicted losses, or shocks. Shocks in this 
context can be sudden decreases in investment and/or consumption, causing higher 
default ratios and thereby losses. Such shocks can come from decreased foreign 
demand, from a down-turn in the business cycle, from natural disasters, or from a 
sudden drop in asset prices. We will in the following focus on the latter, namely a 
sudden drop in asset prices as caused by a bursting asset bubble.
2.2. Bubbles
A potential contributor to the inherent bank instability created by the factors 
mentioned above are asset bubbles. Asset bubbles have many definitions, and 
different definitions give different economic significance. The definition is thus not 
arbitrary. We will in the following employ a definition of bubble as price increases 
of assets, that do not correspond to their future returns (or “fundamentals”), but 
rather to expected future price growth. With backward looking expectations, this 
means that decelerating prices will cause investors to demand less assets, potentially 
causing a crash in the prices. This crash potentially transmits to banks through 
defaults. This can, but does not always, lead to a systemic banking crisis. Since 
bubbles are essential to our theoretical approach, we will in the following give more 
in-depth explanations of bubbles from different theoretical approaches, but first we 
will dwell a bit more on the definition.
Notice that our definition goes against that of Blanchard (1979) and 
Blanchard & Watson (1983). They argue that bubbles can grow and burst even with 
rational expectations and full and equal information. If the risk of collapse is known 
by everyone, but returns with no collapse are high, prices will be above their 
1 For a more formal definition see section 4.4.
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fundamental value when the collapse happens. They show how this can have real 
effects on the economy, even when rationally expected real returns are based on 
fundamentals and equal among assets2. This definition is the basis of the non-
interventionist bubble-policy sketched by Bernanke in (2002), which can be seen 
from his modeling in Bernanke and Gertler (2000). Here the authors include an 
exogenous asset bubble in a standard new Keynesian macro economic model, but 
assume that the bubble is either based solely on fundamentals, or detached from 
fundamentals while assuming that future investments are made solely based on 
fundamentals (ibid., p. 6). This approach to bubbles will not be applied here, due to 
the clear evidence from the recent crisis supporting asset prices deviating 
significantly from fundamentals and causing busts much more prominent than what 
is predicted by these models. The evidence is excellently summarized by Bernanke 
himself in his 2010 speech for the American Economic Association (Bernanke, 
2010), though combined with little or no regret with regard to policy.
The monetarist approach on the other hand, view bursting bubbles as 
the result of failed monetary policy rather than market failures, meaning that as long 
as central banks keep to their jobs of supplying enough liquidity to obtain stable 
inflation, the market will take care of the rest (Friedman & Schwartz, 1982, 1986). 
This is basically a rejection of the entire concept of bubbles, and arguably disregards 
the possibility of differing inflation rates between sectors, most notably between 
assets and consumption (see O'Driscoll Jr 2009, Kindleberger and Aliber 2011, 
p15). The monetarist approach builds heavily upon Irving Fisher (1933), who was 
the first to show how excessively high debt-levels could cause substantial crashes 
when repayment causes deflation. The basic argument is that repayment causes asset 
selling which lowers the circulation of money, which causes lower prices and 
activity, which in turn increases the real debt - meaning that debt liquidation can 
actually cause higher real debt levels, inducing a negative spiral. In Fisher's view, 
over investment is not a problem without over indebtedness, and over indebtedness 
need not cause problems as long as deflation is avoided (if needed through 
government interference) in the process of liquidation. 
Friedrich Hayek and the Austrian school on the other hand view 
bubbles much like our definition, but sees investment behavior as secondary to 
monetary policy as the culprit. While being proponents of the neutrality of money in 
2 The effects of such bubbles are however much lower than those of the Ponzi-type bubbles 
described below. 
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the long run, “the Austrians” see bubbles as a result of monetary policy (both from 
private and central banks) prior to the crisis. They see too low interest rates as an 
accelerator of asset prices over consumption prices, due to interest rates working 
firstly through investments, while affecting consumption only secondary (Butos, 
1985; Hayek, 1939; Leijonhufvud, 2009). Their policy suggestions are of the 
“hands-off variety” post crisis, meaning that expansionary monetary policy would 
be futile, or even contra-productive due to inflating asset prices even more. This 
argument is, as we will see, very similar to that of the Ponzi-style bubbles of 
Minsky, and in fact the kinship between Hayek and Minsky might be stronger than 
what one would think. The ongoing debate on whether central banks should focus 
only on keeping inflation stable (as measured by CPI), or also should be watchful of 
asset prices to avoid bubbles from occurring, is thus in many ways a debate between 
the monetarist approach and the Austrian/Minsky approach. Many argue for a 
middle ground, where the central bank keeps an eye on both general inflation and 
asset prices (see Cecchetti, Genberg & Wadhwani, 2002; Gruen, Plumb & Stone, 
2005).
Before we move on to Minsky, we should however mention that the 
short survey above clearly is superficial, and in some ways outdated. But we believe 
that the basic ideas depicted here and below are exhaustive with regard to the basic 
mechanisms behind bubbles. Clearly many of the newer contributions to the field 
are overlooked here, and much progress has been made on modeling bubble 
behavior in different markets. However, we see these contributions as building, 
more or less explicitly, on the basic underlying explanations of bubble behavior 
mentioned above and below. For an excellent review of the more recent 
contributions we can however recommend Brunnermeier (2003). 
2.2.1. Minsky
Hyman P. Minsky warned of the inherent instability of financial systems during the 
relative tranquil period of the late 1960's. Though not given much heed at the time 
his theories have recently reemerged and been given mainstream attention (Cassidy, 
2008). 
As mentioned above, the Minsky approach to bubbles is related to that 
of the Austrian school. Common to them both is the emphasis on the price distorting 
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effects of investments. Minsky separates between hedge, speculative, and Ponzi 
financial units. Hedge units are able to repay their loans and interest based on their 
cash flow, speculative units can only pay interest from their cash flow and are 
dependent on selling assets or rolling over debt (taking on new loans) in order to 
repay maturing debt. Ponzi units cannot pay either interest, nor repay their loans 
based on cash flow, and are dependent on selling assets or rolling over debt in order 
to pay their creditors anything at all. Speculative and Ponzi units are dependent on 
the increase of asset prices being higher than the level of their interest rates in order 
to survive. Thus they are dependent on an uninterrupted flow of capital to their 
sector keeping asset inflation high (Minsky, 1977, 1992). Thereby any slight 
increase in the interest rate or exogenous decrease in investments could cause all 
Ponzi units to get out of their positions simultaneously, potentially causing a 
complete collapse of asset prices, which in turn will cause a Fisher-style crash in the 
economy3. The novelty of Minsky's approach is that the increasing relative prices of 
the bubble-asset is both the cause and effect of speculation, and thus bubbles are 
sectoral, reinforcing, and can appear at any time and point. Furthermore, in Minsky-
bubbles the monetarist/Fisher solution of boosting inflation will not be sufficient, as 
it does not solve the fundamental problem of over-priced assets. Once a bubble is 
inflated, it inevitably needs to burst. The government in Minsky's view has to keep 
the bubble from building, or keep the burst from spreading through the economy, 
but never keep an already existing bubble from bursting (ibid).
Following Kalecki (1942), Minsky sees the rate of profit as depending 
on (and actually equaling) the level of new investments and government deficits for 
all periods (Minsky, 1982, 1992). This is based on Kalecki's steady state 
assumptions, and is arguably one of the more dubious sides of Minsky's theory. 
Using this simplification he argues that big government can reverse crashes through 
increasing deficits, and thereby boosting investments and profits once again. His 
policy suggestion is  big government active in “resource creation and development” 
rather than consumption creation (Minsky, 1982, p.13). He however becomes less 
bombastic later in his career, emphasizing the innovative tendencies of finance, and 
the role of government in being one step ahead in the regulatory framework in order 
to hinder the emergence of new Ponzi-type financial instruments. He argues 
3 Fisher himself actually points to a Minsky-type effect exacerbating bubbles some 30 years before 
Minsky
Fisher, Irving. (1933). "The debt-deflation theory of great depressions." Econometrica: Journal 
of the Econometric Society:337-357.(see Fisher 1933, article 47b)
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forcefully towards the adaptation of policy to changing environments, and that there 
exists no one-size-fits-all policy (Minsky, 1993).
The bubbles of Minsky seemingly necessitates Galbraith-type 
irrationality (see Galbraith, 1994) or limited information, as the Ponzi-units rely on 
ever-increasing asset prices and razor thin margins. The investors holding assets 
when a bubble bursts are doomed to loose, and rational investors would shun the 
Ponzi scheme all together. The literature however has several explanations as to 
why investors would chose such a tactic. Managers not knowing their own relative 
ability to value risk and profitability can cause herd behavior (Scharfstein & Stein, 
1990), habits, heterogeneous investors with regards to risk and/or information and 
different forms of irrational expectations can do the same (see Campbell, 1999, for a 
survey) and, as we will see below, so can inequality.  Minsky himself wasn't too 
preoccupied with the formal modeling of investment behavior, he found it sufficient 
to state that prolonged periods of stability would increase the probability of Ponzi-
behavior, basically assuming backward looking expectations on volatility.
Charles Kindleberger contributed to the understanding of bubble 
behavior from a different angle. He applied the Minsky hypothesis in his 
monumental Manias, Panics and Crises – A History of Financial Crises (5th 
edition, post mortem, co-written by Aliber, 2011), and through a rigorous historical 
review arguably contributed more to the Minsky hypothesis than Minsky himself. 
The historical perspective allows for a case-by-case walk through of bubbles using 
Minsky's arguments while disregarding some of the theory's shaky foundations. He 
argues that the government, functioning as a lender of last resort, if possible should 
stop the bubble from growing, but if too late should “wait long enough for the 
insolvent firms to fail, but not so long as to let the crisis spread to the solvent firms 
that need liquidity—‘delaying the death of the strong swimmers,’ as Clapham4 put 
it” (ibid. p. 241). His major contribution is however on showing how speculative 
behavior seems to arise in periods of high investments and general optimism, due to 
inflation in asset prices making it profitable.
The Minsky-Kindleberger hypothesis summarized above is the basis 
of the argument introduced later in the thesis, where we will argue that wealth 
hoarding is one of the fundamental causes of Minsky-bubbles, and thus that 
4 Kindleberger here quotes Sir John Clapham (1945). The bank of England: a history (Vol. 2). The 
University Press. 
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inequality increases both the probability of and the severity of a bubble burst. First 
we will however look at some other bubble-theories.
2.2.2. Schumpeter
Schumpeter, following Kondratiev, introduced technology-driven long waves of 
growth (Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter & Fels, 1939). In his view new technology 
developed by innovators creates large profits which induces investments by 
imitators. The large influx of investments is followed by many failures, and in a 
period of unrest the strong firms survive while the weak ones go under (ibid). These 
periods of “creative destruction” are are arguably analogue to the bursting of a 
technology driven bubble. Elliot (1980) actually argues that Schumpeter's analysis is 
similar to Marx's, but where Marx saw ever growing wealth and decreasing profit 
rates as forcing a revolution and bursting the bubble of capitalism, Schumpeter saw 
limits to investments as causing declines in profit rates, bursting the growth cycle, 
and spurring new innovation. So, arguably both Schumpeter and Marx wrote about 
the bubble-concept, but we will in the following focus on the Schumpeterian 
approach.
We will not dwell to much on the literature here, but we will give a 
short account on some contributions, in order to compare his legacy to that of 
Minsky. Kleinknecht (1981) shows how the emergence of new technologies are 
likely to come during a crisis, due to investors' need to try something new. He thus 
anticipates the separation between the transformation and rationalization periods 
defined by Lennart Schön (1991, 2009), basically equivalent to the installation and 
deployment periods defined by Carlota Perez (Freeman & Perez, 1988; Perez, 
2006). In these theories new technology finds its way into production during the 
aftermaths of a declining growth cycle, the new technology after a while gives large 
profits to the firms who master it, this gives incentives for more investments in the 
technology and spurs rapid growth. As the technology spreads, the profit rates 
decline, technological innovation gives way to cost-cutting, and the high investment 
rates become unsustainable, a recession follows, and investors (having exhausted 
the possibilities of the old technology) start looking for a new technology. Thus the 
cycle repeats itself, making SBCs regular events.
Minsky himself (being a former student of Schumpeter) became an 
outspoken critic of Schumpeter's work towards the end of his career, saying that he 
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was too influenced by Walrasian economics, and thus blinded by the axiom of real 
(Minsky, 1986). By this he meant that Schumpeter underestimated the influence of 
monetary values, and disregarded the lessons from Keynes on the relative demand 
for liquidity. He meant that the asset pricing effects in the last stages of 
Schumpeter's growth cycles were understated, and that the monetary influence thus 
was underestimated. As argued by Knell (2012) Minsky relied more on the animal 
spirits of Keynes than the innovations on Schumpeter, and the two can thus be seen 
as opposing theories on what is basically the same issue.
Carlota Perez (2009) however argues that the two approaches are 
relevant for different cases. She differentiates between Major Technology Bubbles 
(MTBs), which are basically Schumpeterian boom-bust cycles, and Easy Liquidity 
Bubbles (ELBs) which are basically Minsky Bubbles. She argues that the last stages 
of MTBs are driven by inflating asset prices, but that since they are started by 
technological opportunities, they are driven by a technological pull rather than an 
easy credit push, and that this makes them fundamentally different from ELBs 
(ibid). In her eyes, the reaction to the dot-com bubble was what created the sub-
prime bubble. Low interest rates, inflow of liquidity from emerging markets, and 
purchasing power being kept up by cheap imports, allowed the financial industry of 
the US to keep on unchecked. This combined with the computerized trade 
developed in the proceeding years let speculation be institutionalized in the financial 
system, and allowed for a devastating Minsky bubble to grow in real estate (ibid). 
This argument supports Minsky's assertion of the financial industry being the 
industry most prone to Schumpeterian innovation, and in need of vigorous 
regulation (Minsky, 1993). Thus the policy advice becomes similar to that of 
Kindleberger (2011); making sure that the bubble really burst - all the while keeping 
the burst from spreading to the rest of the economy. The difference in their initial 
conditions become secondary, as they are driven to the last stage by the same 
mechanisms.
2.2.3. Inequality and Credit Demand
When bubbles appear in real estate, the Schumpeterian explanations clearly do not 
apply, and as argued by Perez (see above), the bubble is likely to be driven by 
Minsky-type asset price inflation and easy access to credit. However, in Perez' 
framework part of the reason could be found in the preceding period of introducing 
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new technology. This period increases inequality and induces heavy investments, if 
the following bubble does not burst sufficiently credit will continue to flow to new 
sources (Perez, 2006). Keen (2009) argues along the same lines, creating a model 
where speculation becomes profitable, and where federal policy pushes financial 
capital in to new bubbles when one bubble bursts. Thus the relative small recessions 
in the US economy following apparent bubbles in the 90's and early 2000's were due 
to high financial fortunes, and the FED pushing their problems ahead. He 
followingly argues that the sub-prime bubble will be the last, due to no new possible 
takers of credit. The same basic argument is found throughout Rajan's (2011) 
influential book Fault Lines. 
However, households are arguably different from other financial units, 
and as shown by Barbra and Pivetti (2009), the debt levels of US households cannot 
be explained by cheap credit and increasing housing prices alone. They implicitly 
argue that households are less prone to Ponzi-type speculation, and that their 
increased indebtedness has to be due to other factors. Their basic argument is that 
the decreasing or stagnating real wages of working class US citizens, coupled with 
the entry of new expensive technology on the market and the large relative increase 
of the purchasing power of their neighbors, cause them to want higher consumption 
than what they can currently afford. Thus they argue against the standard life-cycle 
model, where borrowing is used by rational individuals to smooth consumption over 
a life-time. This also contradicts the theories saying that increased debt levels were 
rational given the low interest rates and ever-increasing housing prices (be it due to 
Ponzi bubbles, or other causes). In their eyes the extraction of property wealth for 
consumption is better explained by the wish to uphold relative contemporary 
consumption levels (when faced with decreasing relative wages) even at the expense 
of future consumption levels.  When large segments of society does this, aggregate 
consumption is boosted in the present at the expense of aggregate future demand. 
Thus causing a boom and bust cycle. In their eyes, this was made possible partly 
through policies aimed at boosting consumer credit (low interest rates and relaxed 
regulation on credit-worthiness), but most of all due to rising inequality (ibid). Their 
theory is motivated by the evolution of wages in the US, where income inequality 
has increased substantially the last 30 years, while consumption inequality has 
remained stable (see David, Katz & Kearney, 2006; Iacoviello, 2008; Krueger & 
Perri, 2006). 
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The theory of Barbra and Pivetti (2009) is based on a “keeping up with 
the Joneses” assumption on utility, where utility from consumption depends on the 
consumption of others in the economy (see Abel, 1990), with roots in the emulation 
motive of Veblen (2005 [1899]). Kapeller & Schütz (2012) use the same 
assumption in their model of Veblen-Minsky cycles. They build a model where 
increased inequality builds demand for credit. Their model predicts increasing 
interest rates with aggregate credit (as assumed by Minsky), but like Minsky they 
assume that the banking sector's margin of safety decreases with time of financial 
stability, meaning that the increased demand for credit will be supplied at rather 
stable interest rates. This is not sustainable, and busts will inevitably happen. They 
simulate their model, and find regular bubbles when inequality is present (ibid). 
Matteo Iacoviello (2008) has another approach to inequality and 
banking crises. His model operates with homogeneous households making decisions 
based on expected future income, increased inequality within this framework entails 
increased magnitude of the modeled idiosyncratic shocks to income. Households 
want to save in good times and borrow in bad times to smooth consumption, and 
since all deviations from mean income are viewed as temporary, household debt 
levels increase with inequality. This explains how income inequality can rise while 
inequality of consumption remains more or less constant. However, it assumes 
complete income mobility, and the debt levels that arise in the model are completely 
sustainable (ibid.) – thus it has little or no explanatory power for crises. The same 
goes for Krueger and Perri's (2006) modeling, which is basically identical for all 
practical purposes.
Cynamon & Farazzi (2008) explain rising household debt ratios with 
cultural effects. They view the life-cycle model as overly simplified, and reject the 
rational choice paradigm. They chose to view consumption propensity as exogenous 
and evolving over time, they thus explain the recent crisis with increased 
consumerism in the US society, and Minsky-type bubble formation (ibid).
Abel (1990), who developed the relative consumption utility function 
used in much of the above-mentioned literature, used it to show how the equity 
premium puzzle can be explained (safer savings are preferred when relative 
consumption levels matter). Gómez, Priestley and Zapatero (2002, 2009) use a 
similar argument, but for wealth. They show how agents caring about their relative 
wealth evolution when making investment decisions makes for a negative risk 
premium for domestic assets, thus allowing for economy-wide asset bubbles 
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occurring in an open-economy environment. DeMarzo Kaniel and Kremer (2008) 
use relative wealth to explain herding behavior. Through using a finite horizon, 
multi-generational savings decision model they show how changes in wealth affects 
relative asset prices due to actors seeking the same risk profile as their peers in order 
to avoid being poor when the others are rich. Thus relatively wealthy generations 
can theoretically herd towards risky investments, inducing negative risk premia and 
possible bubbles. 
It should be mentioned that the literature reviewed in this sub-section 
is rather selective. The increased household debt levels in the US were for a long 
time viewed as a positive, and even stabilizing, factor (see for example Campbell & 
Hercowitz, 2005). After all, the period from the mid-80's running up to the 2007 
meltdown was famously dubbed “the Great Moderation” due to the unprecedented 
financial stability of developed economies in the period. The policies running up to 
the crisis were, and still are by some, praised for their stabilizing effects (see 
Bernanke, 2004; Stock & Watson, 2003). In other words, where Perez (2009) and 
Keen (2009) saw the FED as pushing problems ahead when directing credit towards 
households, others saw them as doing a good job. The focus above has however 
been on household debts in a bubble context. Given the evidence, I believe this 
focus is justified.
2.2.4. Inequality and Credit Supply
Above we have seen different theoretical explanations as to how bubbles can grow. 
We have seen how businesses and households potentially can demand credit to such 
a high degree that the debt to income ratios become unsustainable under any other 
circumstances than increasing asset prices. We have also seen how investors can 
herd toward one type of asset, making for a sectoral asset bubble. However, this 
might not be the whole story.
Most of the above mentioned literature focuses on the demand side of 
credit, showing how increasing asset prices, cultural factors, new technology and/or 
inequality, coupled with eased access to credit can make financial units increase 
their debt to income ratios. However, as argued by Bernanke (2010), the high credit-
supply growth of the US in the pre-2007 era cannot be explained by monetary policy 
alone. And even though some of the theories above can explain how investors tend 
to herd towards the same type of assets, they cannot explain excessively high 
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aggregate credit rates. Leaving aside foreign capital for a moment (we'll get to that) 
increased borrowing by some has to be accompanied by increased saving by others. 
Indeed the last 40 years in the US has seen a large increase in the net wealth of the 
richest percentages of the US economy, and they have been major suppliers of credit 
(see Budrıa, Dıaz-Giménez, Quadrini & Rıos-Rull 2002; Kennickell, 2003; Piketty 
& Saez, 2003). Furthermore, this increase in wealth inequality has been much higher 
than the corresponding income disparities.  As argued by Cagetti & De Nardi (2008) 
the high savings rates of the very rich can not be explained by regular life cycle 
models, even with very high returns to capital5. This means that asset bubbles 
cannot explain the supply of credit, only the demand for it. The models that have 
been successful in predicting the high savings rates and concentration of wealth 
among the very rich, and thereby the increase in credit supply, are models in which 
the standard life cycle assumption is modified to either allow for inter generational 
bequests (agents receiving utility by leaving inheritance to their children), or having 
dynasties (generations of families) be agents either having low inter temporal 
discount factors or receiving utility directly from holding wealth (ibid). In either 
case, “initial” inequality increases through time as well-off agents have higher 
saving propensities than less well off agents. Carroll (1998) justifies letting wealth 
be a contributor of utility in itself by the fact that very rich people seldom chose to 
consume of their wealth during their lifetime. Whether this is due to wanting to 
leave wealth for their children, or simply due to having a level of consumption that 
is saturated and not wanting to waste wealth, is rather irrelevant. His argument is 
that since accumulation of wealth up to the point of death is desired by the very rich, 
any utility function that prefers holding wealth at death over not holding it (for 
agents with very high consumption levels) is an improvement over utility functions 
that do not (ibid). We will later incorporate such a utility function in a standard 
growth model, showing how unsustainable debt accumulation will be the outcome.
This kind of utility functions makes net savings less dependent on demand 
for capital. Rather than being a way of putting financial wealth to work for future 
consumption, saving becomes a way of keeping and increasing wealth as a goal in itself.  
Kumhof & Rancière (2010) uses this kind of utility function to show how increased 
bargaining power of the 5% richest (giving increased income inequality) will 
increase their supply of credit to the rest of the economy. Thus household credit 
ratios (dubbed leverage) will increase. Through a calibrated simulation they show 
5  The return to capital was in fact quite low in the period in question.
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how high leverage levels will entail a crises unless the bargaining power of the 95% 
increases, and that the crises itself will not do much to decrease leverage levels, thus 
more crises will follow unless inequality is reduced. This is the only formal 
modeling on the link between wealth hoarding and inequality that I know of.
The link has however been treated in several less formal work (often 
relying on anecdotal evidence). One such example is Stiglitz (2013), who recently 
has argued that reallocation of means from rich savers to poorer consumers is 
pivotal to recovery. Branco Milanovic (2009) argues that the immense holdings in 
the hands of the very rich paved the way for increased risk-taking, while Thaker & 
Williamson (2012) view the increased wealth of the few as causing instability 
through the purchase of political power, which has caused financial deregulation, 
not unlike the argument put forward by Paul Krugman & Robert Wells (2012) who 
in addition see the aversion towards contra cyclical financial policies as a result of 
the political influence of the very rich. Hockett & Dillon (2013) see the wealth 
concentration as causing instability through an argument combining increasing 
saving propensities with wealth and a Kaleckian view on effective demand - saying 
that savings will not stimulate the economy (consumption) directly, only 
investments.
Much of the above mentioned literature applies a logic which was first 
put forward by Marx, though seldom, if ever, acknowledging it. Marx therefore 
deserves some treatment when reviewing their arguments. In the his approach, the 
propensity to save among the capitalists makes for accelerating savings, but seeing 
how savings must equal investments and investments are decided by demand for 
production, a very unequal society is likely to suffer from too little demand to 
absorb the level of desired investments, and as the savings of the capitalist class 
accelerates, capitalism either has to move to new markets or implode (Robinson, 
1942, p. 50-60). The Marxist approach is intuitively appealing, but relies on 
equilibrium of demand and supply being the exception rather than the rule, and is 
incompatible with most economic modeling. Kalecki applied a similar approach, 
and showed how savings stimulate investments more than consumption, and thus 
cyclicality is an inevitability (Sebastiani, 1989). The Keynesian approach relates to 
this, and the concept of effective demand deals with similar issues, but as argued by 
Shaikh & Semmler (1989) does not take into account the independent movements of 
supply and demand. Arguably the Marxist approach is a different paradigm all 
together, and incompatible with standard economic modeling. This could be one 
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explanation as to why prominent economists such as Stiglitz formulate similar 
arguments in editorials, while leaving them out of formal modeling. None the less, 
the arguments could bring aspects on the table that are easily overlooked in formal 
modeling, that is why I chose to include it here.
2.2.5. Foreign Influence
Most of the above mentioned literature focuses on closed economies. If bubbles 
arise from increased demand for credit, the openness of the economy has little 
influence (except of course for the possibility of rapid capital flight at the burst of a 
bubble). However, when looking at the supply side of credit, openness clearly is 
very relevant. Increases in credit supply can come from foreign sources, and can 
thus come much faster than within a domestic context. Furthermore; hoarding of the 
rich need not increase investment domestically, as they have the opportunity to 
invest abroad. Nonetheless, there is much evidence towards a “domestic bias” when 
it comes to investments and general placement of financial capital (see Abel, 1990), 
so the credit supply argument need not vanish with an open economy. 
A lot has been written on the relationship between financial openness 
and fragility, and we have too limited space to go through it all. With regard to asset 
bubbles Wolfson (2002) argues that financial globalization functions as an 
accelerator of financial innovation, making regulations harder. In his view this 
facilitates a form of global Ponzi-scheme. On the less extreme side of the 
discussion, there is a growing body on literature seeing the hoarding of foreign 
reserves by governments in developing countries as an insurance against rapid 
outflows of capital. In this view the increasing levels of expensive short term debt 
from foreign sources of the private sector necessitates the government to hoard low-
yeilding foreign reserves such as US securities. This constitutes a net loss for the 
economy, but is arguably necessary in a global context where capital controls are 
frowned upon. (see Aizenman & Lee, 2007; Jeanne & Rancière, 2008; Mendoza, 
2004; and Rodrik, 2006)
Allen & Gale (2000) propose a model where globalization of financial 
flows increase the propensity of asset prices to grow out of proportion by simple 
herding behavior of international investors. Thus the onset of a bubble from any of 
the causes mentioned above could be intensified by a internationally open financial 
market.
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Others again argue that financial liberalization hinder harmful 
repression by governments, increasing efficiency and stability in the workings of the 
financial market. Stulz (2005) in this regards views a Miskin-style financial lobby-
class as a road block to the full potential gains of liberalization, but argues that 
liberalization lowers their power, and thus can increase stability. 
With regard to the current crises, the argument has often involved 
international financial flows. Some argue that the under-evaluation of the renmibi 
and the high savings of China are causing a “savings-glut”, where unsustainable 
debt in the US is the result (Bernanke, 2005; Funke & Rahn, 2005; Lemmen, 2006), 
this is basically a global supply-of.credit argument in reverse, where the rich are 
blaiming the poor for supplying them with too much credit. If we follow the self-
insurance arguments mentioned above, and see the total gains of the US economy 
from the spread between debt and foreign holdings, the picture however changes 
drastically, and as argued by Krugman (2007) this could be a reason for the dollar 
collapse.
Clearly the picture gets a lot more complicated when the openness of 
an economy is taken in to consideration. The theoretical effects from inequality 
become less prominent, regardless; both the supply and demand side effects of 
income inequality will (if present) function also in an open economy. If the effects 
will be stronger or weaker is hard to say. Surely the demand for credit is easier met 
in a global credit market (especially if the domestic market is considered safe). 
Regarding the supply side of bubbles, one could argue that a bubble driven by 
supply from the very rich could potentially be double harmful in an open 
environment, as the very rich are likely to be more prone to capital flight in the 
event of a collapse.
2.3. Bubbles in Banking Crises
Above we have seen how different theories explain asset bubbles. The relation to 
banking crises is obvious, however it is hard to evaluate the relative importance of 
asset bubbles in historical banking crises without going through them case by case. 
Fortunately we do not have the space available to do so in this thesis, and even more 
fortunate; others have done it for us. In the following we will give some examples of 
authors seeing asset bubbles as driving forces in different SBCs. There is in general 
page 19
Inequality as a Cause of Systemic Banking Crises
̶  Some New Theory and Evidence
seldom agreement on the causes of SBCs (if there were, this thesis would be 
unnecessary), and the referred works should not be taken to represent the general 
opinions of the academic field on the issue. 
The highly influential works of Reinhart & Rogoff (2008) gives an 
holistic view on crises and asset bubbles, they show how investors and policy 
makers repeatedly fool themselves into thinking that “this time it's different”. 
Exuberant investments, ever-increasing asset prices, increasing debt levels (often 
from foreign sources) are found to be essential ingredients in episodes of financial 
crises over the last centuries, and every time the bubble is disregarded until the 
moment it bursts. Schularick & Taylor (2009) use a similar approach of comparing 
long run historical data, when they find that credit booms gone wrong constitute the 
basic explanations for most major crises. Kindleberger & Aliber (2011) show how 
major historic crises are driven by credit booms creating asset bubbles, through 
rigorous qualitative analyses.
On a less macro-level Borio, Kennedy & Prowse (1994) give evidence 
towards increased credit access creating asset booms in among other places 
Scandinavia, Japan, the UK and Netherlands in the late 80's. All the while Hunter 
(2005) gives an account of asset bubbles causing crises in Latin America and Asia 
in the late 20th century, as well as the stock-market crash dubbed the dot-com-bubble 
(all though the latter did not transfer to become a full-blown SBC, it was close). 
Hoffmann (2010) argues that the same basic mechanisms were driving the string of 
crises in central and eastern Europe in the transition from the Soviet era, showing 
how fast and furious liberalization led to a bonanza inflating assets to unsustainable 
levels.
All-in-all, one can say a lot about the role of asset bubbles in banking 
crises, most of which others have already said. Safe to say, they are viewed as 
important drivers of financial and banking crises by policy makers and academics 
alike.
3. Theoretical Modeling
In this section of the thesis we will incorporate both Minsky bubbles and wealth 
hoarding in a simple theoretical model, showing how income inequality increases 
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the probability of growing and bursting a Minsky-type bubble in a closed economy. 
Thus giving a theoretical framework to the role of credit supply in asset bubbles.
3.1. The Model
We modify a simple Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans model to include wealth hoarding 
and Minsky price behavior on assets. By doing this we show how inequality can 
produce negative real interest rates in steady state, rendering steady state improbable 
and paving the way for bursting asset bubbles.
Producers
We introduce an aggregate production function with decreasing returns to labor and 
constant returns to capital. 
f (K t , Lt)=α Lt
σ K t
Where L is labor, and K is capital. The finished good can be used for consumption 
or capital. 
f (K t , Lt)=C t+δk ,t K t+(K t+1−K t)
However, we will later show how the depreciation rate increases with capital levels, 
making the return to stable capital levels decrease with the size of the capital stock 
(thus indirectly giving decreasing returns to capital).
Consumers
We split the consumers in to two groups, where one owns the banks and thus 
decides on investment positions, while the other can chose to save or borrow from 
the banks. The bank owners (group 2)  receive interest on capital and loans, and 
bear losses directly. The means available to consumption for the two groups, will 
thus be given by:
R1=w1+S z ,t+1−(1+r z ,t−δz ,t)S z , t
R2=w2+∑ (1+r i , t−δi , t)S i , t−S i ,t+1
The net savings (S i) of group two can come in two forms, where S z , t  is net 
lending from group two to group one and S k ,t≡K t  is invested capital. The return to 
capital (r k )  and interest rate on loans (r z)  are determined in the market. 
The depreciation of the different types of savings are assumed to be 
given by the following:
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δi ,t=ρi S i ,t−mi(
S i ,t−S i ,t−1
S i , t−1
)
ρi
 is here a parameter that describes how the depreciation rate of a form of saving 
relates to the stock of savings, the idea is that higher levels of investments or 
lending necessitate more risk. mi  is what we decide to call the Minsky factor. It is 
included to account for a rise in investments increasing the price of assets, thus 
reducing the depreciation rate, or even making it negative. It is incorporated in the 
depreciation in order to be able to operate with one stable price for the joint 
capital/consumption good.
The consumers in group one gain utility only from consumption, while 
the bank owners (group two) are assumed to have capitalist spirits, and thus receive 
utility from holding wealth (following Carroll, 1998). 
U 1=∑ βt γ ln (c1, t)
U 2=∑βt [ γ ln (c2, t)+ω S t ]
Profit maximization:
We set the price of the good as the numéraire. Profit maximization thus gives us:
σα L t
σ−1 K t=w t
The entire profit goes to the capital owners (group 2), who make future investment 
decisions based on the return of capital observed in the current period:
πt=α Lt
σ K t (1−σ)≡r k ,t K t ⇒ rk , t=α Lt
σ(1−σ)
The labor force is given by L1+L2=2 , L1=L2 , seeing how there is no disutility to 
labor, the use of labor is thus predetermined at 2. Even though the two groups of 
labor are homogeneous in regard to productivity, we let them differ in wages based 
on negotiating power, making for:
w1, t=(1−t)wt  and w 2, t=(1+t )w t
Utility maximization:
We assume steady state (using the transversality condition) and maximize the 
infinite horizon utility. 
d U 1
d lt+1
=0
 ⇒1+r l=β
−1
The consumers in group one will demand limitless borrowing at interest rates lower 
than this, and supply limitless savings at higher interest rates.
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d U 2
d lt+1
=0
 
⇒
l
K
=
ρk
ρl
The ratio between physical capital stock and total credit to consumers (group 1) will 
be given by the inverse ratio of the depreciation factors.
d U 2
d K t+1
=0
 
⇒ ri−δi=
γρl
l
K
−ω
w2
K
ω(1+ l
k
)
While the real return to both capital and credit rate will be given by the expression 
above. Note that the Minsky factor does not affect the steady state, as the net growth 
in any asset always will be zero.
Equilibrium
Combining the steady state optimization conditions lets us find the equilibrium real 
return to savings: 
r i−δi=
γρK−ω(1+t)ασ 2
σ−1
ω(1+
ρl
ρk )
We will not model any of the dynamics here, but rather do an interpretation of this 
steady state. 
It can easily be proven that the steady rate of real return to savings 
expressed above always will be negative for all positive values of ω and t, and 
become more negative for higher values of these parameters. Meaning that if one 
group receives utility from holding wealth, and that group has higher income than 
the rest, they will hoard wealth until the real return to savings become negative. The 
higher income they have, and the more they value wealth, the more negative returns 
to savings have to be for them to stop saving. 
If they did not receive any utility from wealth, the steady state return to 
capital would of course be zero as in the standard model. Even zero returns are 
potentially unstable with the minsky factor, as any negative shock to investments 
would cause an increase in depreciation, causing lower real returns and even lower 
new investments the next period. However, if a central bank were to react by 
lending out money at negative real interest rates this would not only boost 
investments, but also give new liquidity to the system, ensuring stable inflation. 
When a movement back towards steady state occurs, investors having borrowed 
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from the central bank at negative rates, have to repay less than they borrowed, thus 
money supply is increased also in the long run. The same will in fact be the case for 
contractive policies, where the central bank borrows money (sells bonds) at positive 
rates. Thus the central bank can rather easily secure a stable variation around the 
steady state.
However, when steady rates are negative, investors will constantly 
push real returns towards negative values. If the negative rates start exceeding 
inflation, holding cash could become the optimum. The central bank thus needs to 
keep inflation higher than the absolute value of the steady rate. The problem arises 
as central banks giving rates on bonds higher than the (negative) steady rate will 
have to keep supplying ever increasing amount of bonds to supply the appetite of 
savings. This of course will cause deflation.
If deinvestments sets in, quick stimulation is needed in a Minsky-
world like this. Imagine a situation of zero returns on government bonds: as savings 
in capital and credit to consumers increases, the riskiness of projects will increase 
and so will the returns, eventually reaching zero. At which point investors switch to 
buying bonds, and deflation sets in. Stimulating the system with negative rates on 
bonds in this situation will only cause investors to sell (or buy less) bonds (as they 
will demand an ever-increasing amount of bonds at rates higher than the steady 
rate). If investors sell bonds, this will stimulate investments and increase money 
supply temporarily, but a return to pre-simuli levels will necessitate taking liquidity 
out of the system. Thus the central bank needs to keep lowering rates until it  
reaches the steady rate expressed above. At negative rates on bonds, securing stable 
and positive inflation becomes a real challenge without any form of redistribution 
(from the hoarders to the consumers). Without inflation, negative returns to savings 
will cause a movement towards holding cash. That; ladies and gentlemen, is when 
the shit hits the fan.
Clearly this is all very abstract, and may be hard to relate to the much 
more complicated real world, but the basic principle is very easy. If wealth is 
wanted for its own sake, it will be demanded even at a price. When holding wealth 
has a price, real returns to savings are negative. When real returns to savings are 
negative, this is because investments are unprofitable. Stimulating the economy 
through credit will thus be impossible, or at least unsustainable. Redistribution will 
be needed.
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Redistribution is here meant in the wide sense, government spending 
through printing money can be viewed as redistribution. Anything that increases the 
purchasing power of consumers over hoarders, as long as it is lasting, is helpful. 
Credit is not, if it has to be repayed. The effects of increased credit to consumers in 
the model is a higher deprecation rate, which is basically higher default levels. 
Which brings us to the point. This is related to banking crises in the following way: 
Credit will keep flowing to consumers and firms until the real return reaches the 
negative steady rate, and there is little the central bank can do about it. When returns 
reach the steady state, any shock will cause the minsky factor to set in, and asset 
prices will plummet (if they haven't already do to cash becoming higher yielding 
than investments even based on fundamentals). At which point we will have a bank 
run, and most likely a systemic banking crisis.
The only way of preventing this in the model is low enough levels of 
inequality. If we assume that the “capitalist spirit” parameter, ω , is a function of 
relative income, the problem can be avoided all together with low enough levels of 
inequality. Even though motivated differently, the consequences are basically 
Kalckian – stimulating investments is not enough, consumption needs to be 
stimulated directly, and this can only be done through redistribution. 
Is this model relevant? Arguably it fits well with the US reality, where 
government bonds face high demand even at negative returns6. Whether or not this 
is due to inequality is of course a major question. In the following we will see some 
empirical evidence linking systemic banking crises to income inequality, which fits 
well with the theory.
4. Empirical Analysis
6 Informed and alert readers might note that the low real return to financial assets in this model 
contradicts the literature on the equity premium puzzle, which shows that returns on equity in 
general is high, and much higher than on government bonds. To that, a couple of things can be 
said. Firstly, the recent experiences has lowered the calculated premium significantly. Secondly, 
the return in the literature is calculated based on stock indexes, and only a minuscule part of the 
calculated returns are actual dividends, the rest is increasing prices of stocks. Meaning that the 
fundamental return (that not based on asset inflation), arguably has been historically low, or even 
negative. This model however predicts that the real return to equity (including price increases) 
will be equal to that of government bonds, which clearly has not been the case historically. In fact 
the distorting taxes often blamed for the equity premium puzzle are likely to be beneficial in this 
model, reducing the risk of asset inflation. This is however an extension we will not embark on in 
this thesis.
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Above we have seen how inequality in theory can have an effect on the growth and 
burst of asset bubbles, which in turn can lead to banking crises. We will in the 
following seek to measure the influence of inequality on the probability of suffering 
a systemic banking crisis. First we will give a short survey of previous empirical 
literature measuring the causes of systemic banking crises, before we apply a 
multivariate logit approach giving evidence pointing towards a causal link leading 
from inequality to systemic banking crises. 
4.1. Data
We have an unbalanced panel of 104 countries, for the years 1970-2008. We have 
observations of 15 variables. Our dependent variable will be a binary variable 
indicating if an SBC is happening or not for each country-year, for this we have two 
alternative sources.
4.1.2. The Crisis Dummies
CRISIS1 defines a crisis as an SBC if one of the following criteria are 
met: non-performing assets reached at least 10 percent of total assets at the peak of 
the crisis, the cost of the rescue operations was at least 2 percent of GDP,  
emergency measures such as bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket guarantees to 
depositors or other bank creditors, were taken to assist the banking system, or large-
scale nationalizations took place. The variable is constructed by Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache (2005) (DDK hereafter) based on Caprio & Klingebiel (2002) and and 
IMF country reports. The authors use judgment calls to find a correct ending date of 
the crisis based on quantitative and qualitative information, but where they cannot 
make an informed decision, a duration of three years is assumed. It covers the 
period 1980-2002, and identifies 77 SBCs. 
CRISIS2 uses a slightly wider definition for SBCs. The variable is 
constructed by Laeven & Valencia (2012), and defines a crisis as happening if there 
are significant signs of financial distress in the banking system, or if significant 
policy interventions are taken in response to bank sector losses. Significant sings of 
distress are defined as the share of nonperforming loans rising above 20 percent, or 
fiscal restructuring costs exceeding 5 percent of GDP. Significant policy 
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interventions are defined as at least three of the following measures being taken: 
extensive liquidity support, bank restructuring gross costs of at least 3 percent of 
GDP, significant bank nationalizations, significant (new) guarantees put in place, 
significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP), and deposit freezes and/or 
bank holidays. For more detailed definitions of the policy measures, see the original 
paper (ibid.). The ending date of crises is defined as the year before both GDP and 
real credit exhibits positive growth for at least two consecutive years, so crises are 
in general shorter using this variable than CRISIS1. The variable runs from1970-
2011, and identifies 147 SBCs.
4.1.3. The Control Variables
Followingly we will describe the control variables. They are all widely 
used in the literature (see part 4.2), and all have observations spanning from 1970-
2011 for a varying sample of countries. For a detailed description of coverage and 
distributions see table 7 and 8 of the Appendix. The expected signs and their 
justifications described below correspond to part 2 of this thesis, for more details 
and references on this see that part.
M2RES is the ratio between  money supply (M2) and foreign reserve 
holdings. The data corresponds to the variable FM.LBL.MQMY.IR.ZS from the 
World Bank (2013) (hereafter WB)(2013),  except for the Euro-countries, where the 
variable is missing for years preceding the Euro. We have recomputed the variable 
for these country-years using M2*EXC/RES. Where M2 is “Money plus Quasi 
Money” (current local currency) from IMF's International Financial Statistics 
Database (hereafter IFS) (IMF, 2013), EXC is the exchange rate (see below) and 
RES is “Total Reserve Assets” (current US dollars) from the IFS. This computation 
is equal to the one used for the World Bank series. The missing variables in the WB 
data bank is probably due to comparability issues of the domestic money supply 
before and after introducing the Euro (this is discussed part 4.1.5). The variable is 
included to account for vulnerability to sudden capital outflows. 
PCRATIO is the ratio between total credit to the private sector and 
GDP, it corresponds to the variable FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS from the WB, where it is 
computed using IFS data on private credit, and WB data on GDP. For some 
countries this variable also captures credit to public enterprises. It's use is in the 
literature usually justified by being a proxy for financial liberalization and loose 
page 27
Inequality as a Cause of Systemic Banking Crises
̶  Some New Theory and Evidence
regulation. In general it is thought that the higher the ratio, the higher chance for 
risky borrowers, and thereby higher fragility.
PCGROWTH is the real growth rate of private credit, calculated as 
(PCREDIT-L1.PCREDIT) /L1.PCREDIT. Where PCREDIT is calculated taking 
PCRATIO multiplied by real GDP in constant 2005 US dollars (variable 
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD from WB). Growth in private credit is expected to positively 
influence the probability of an SBC through bubble formation or increased risk with 
scale of new loans.
GDPPC is GDP pr capita in constant 2005 US dollars. It corresponds 
to the variable NY.GDP.PCAP.KD in WB. In the literature the variable is usually 
thought to negatively influence the probability of suffering an SBC. The effect is 
either assumed to come through proxying institutional quality, or general stability. 
GROWTH is the annual growth rate of real GDP. It corresponds to the 
variable NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG  in WB. It is generally assumed that growth has a 
negative impact on the probability of suffering a SBC, this is because growth in 
GDP is associated with increased earnings for borrowers, and therefore lower 
default rates.
DEPINS is a dummy taking the variable 1 if the country has an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme in place. The variable is taken from Demirgüç-
Kunt, Karacaovali & Laeven (2005). It only runs until 2003, for the few regressions 
were it is included for a longer time span, insurance schemes are assumed to be 
unchanged since 2003. Deposit insurance can theoretically have both a positive and 
negative effect on the probability of suffering an SBC.
INFLATION is the annual rate of change in the GDP deflator. The 
GDP deflator corresponds to the variable NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS in WB. Inflation is 
expected to have a positive influence effect on the probability of suffering an SBC 
due to often being associated with high nominal interest rates and macroeconomic 
mismanagement.
H is a dummy taking the value one if there is hyperinflation. 
Following Cagan (1956) we define hyperinflation as inflation exceeding 50%. We 
use this to deal with outliers driving the results for real interest rates and inflation.
NH is a dummy taking the value one if there is no hyperinflation. (see 
above)
REALINT is real interest rate. Following DDK (2005) it is calculated 
as the treasury bill rate minus INFLATION, if not available the discount/bank rate is 
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used, if neither that is available the deposit rate is used. All interest rates are from 
the IFS. Treasury bill rate is line 60c, the discount/bank rate is line 60 and the 
deposit rate is line 60l. This is preferred to the World Bank indicator due to the 
between country incomparability of the WB series, and to clearer see the effect of 
monetary policy.
DEPRECIATION is the depreciation of the currency. It is calculated as 
the growth ratio of EXCH. It is included to account for trade shocks. Note that since 
it is calculated using the exchange rate to US dollars, it the variable is zero for all 
countries using the dollar as their currency. It is none the less used given the 
unavailability of a trade-weighted effective exchange rate for a big enough sample 
to be useful. High depreciation is expected to be positively correlated with SBCs do 
to capital flight and adverse shocks on profitability.
EXCH is the local currency to US dollar exchange rate. It corresponds 
to the variable PA.NUS.FCRF of the WB, supplemented with the Euro/dollar 
exchange rate for euro-countries after entering the Euro (missing in WB).
POLITY is an index on the strength of democratic institutions designed 
by the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr, 2010). The index is discrete and 
ranges from -10 to +10 and is increasing in the strength/quality of democratic 
institutions. The index is assumed unchanged from 2010 to 2012. Quality of 
institutions is expected to decrease the probability of SBCs through strengthening 
regulation necessary for keeping the financial system stable.
KAOPEN is an index on the financial openness of the economy. It is 
constructed by Chinn & Ito (2008)  based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions  It is continuous and increasing in the 
openness of the capital account transactions. However, due to being based on 
several binary variables, it is not very dynamic. The direction of the effect of 
financial openness is not clear from the literature, it can be negative due to higher 
exposure to capital flight and international volatility, and it can be positive due to 
increased competition and efficiency in the financial sector.
LIBERALIZATION is constructed to signal a significant liberalization 
in capital markets taken place in the last five years. It is constructed as the difference 
in the KAOPEN variable from 5 years prior to the observation. Liberalization is 
generally thought to have a negative effect on financial stability, following the 
“short run pain, long run gain” (see Kaminsky & Schmukler, 2003).
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FINREFORM is an index constructed by Abiad, Detragiache & 
Tressel (2009) based on IMF country reports. The index runs from 0 to 1, where a 
higher value basically entails less government involvement in seven different 
aspects of financial markets (except for in their “prudential regulation” dimension). 
Note that the index is heavily correlated with KAOPEN, but to a lesser degree with 
POLITY.
Regional Dummies are dummies corresponding to the WB region 
classification. One dummy for each of the seven regions, taking the value 0 of 1, 
depending on if the country is in the region or not (see Appendix for list of regions).
Note that there is one variable not included in our regressions, which 
is commonly included in the literature, and that is changes in terms of trade. This is 
done for two reasons. Firstly I could not find the variable for a sufficiently large 
sample. It seems to have been dropped from both the WB and the IFS databases for 
a large number of countries since the works of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (see 
below). Secondly, it is hardly ever significant in the literature, and when included 
for the 35 countries where we have observations, it does not significantly change the 
results.
4.1.4. The Gini-Coefficient
We use a gini-coefficient to see the effect income inequality has on the probability 
of suffering an SBC. In general gini-coefficients are not comparable between 
countries, and often not even over time within the same countries. The ways of 
measuring income varies greatly, as does the representativity of the samples. For a 
long time the data set created by Deininger & Squire (1996) was preferred for cross 
country studies, but as Atkinson & Brandolini (2001) thoroughly documented, these 
series were riddled with problems that made them virtually useless. Since then the 
University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) (Galbraith & Kum, 2003) has been 
rising in popularity. This study uses the Dininger & Squire dataset, but uses data on 
the between-group inequality of manufacturing wages calculated by the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization's (UNIDO) Industrial Statistics 
database to make them more comparable. More precisely they regress the Deininger 
& Squire gini on the data from UNIDO and a number of controls, and reports 
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predicted values of the gini (ibid). This approach has its advantages, but has several 
caveats, the most serious of which is basing everything on data from one sector.
Another widely used database is that of the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) (Smeeding & Gottschalk, 1995), and that of the UNU-WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID), however both these databases have rather sporadic 
observations, meaning that a panel is virtually impossible to construct for a 
sufficient amount of years and countries (for more on the problems of this data, see 
Galbraith, 2009). 
However Frederick Solt has taken it upon him self to create a 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2009). Using the 
WIID and the LIS, he separates the different gini's based on 21 classifications of 
how and from what sources they were computed, he then continues to estimate the 
value of the ratio between the different categories for each country-year (assumed to 
vary with both country and year) based on all available information. Using this 
estimated value, he estimates the panel for all 21 classifications. Since he believes 
rapid movements in the gini to be unlikely, he contributes this to measurement 
errors, therefore he applies a 5-year moving average of all classifications - including 
interpolation for missing variables (except for the LIS which he considers to be 
superior and have less measurement errors). The moving average is re-generated one 
thousand times using Monte-carlo simulations, and this average is used as the gini 
for each of the 21 classifications for each country-year, standard errors are also 
computed using the same technique. He then uses the estimates with the lowest 
standard errors to estimate the average of all classifications, which gives the gini for 
the country-year in the panel. (ibid)
The description above is for version 1.0 of the SWIID, in the latest 
version (3.1), he also incorporates the UTIP-data plus an array of other sources for 
ginis, adding up to a total of 3600 extra observations. Though no new published 
documentation is given for this database, his entire computation is available online.7 
In other words, this version of the SWIID incorporates all the other sources 
described above. Thus the SWIID is arguably the best international comparable 
database on income inequality. Not only does it give a larger panel than all other 
sources, it also incorporates all major sources in its computation. Furthermore it also 
gives the standard error for each point estimate, which renders the data much more 
7 See http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid/updates.html 
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transparent for researchers to evaluate than most other sources. For these reasons, I 
apply the SWIID-data as the GINI variable in the panel. 
GINI is the gini coefficient on net income inequality. Net income is 
defined as income after redistribution. It corresponds to the variable “gini_net” in 
Solt (2009, SWIID Version 3.1, December 2011) It is a standard gini-coefficient, 
where a value of zero means every percentile has an equal income, while a value of 
one means that the top percentile has all the income and all other percentiles no 
income. According to the discussion in part 2 and 3 we expect GINI to have a 
positive impact on the probability of suffering an SBC.
4.2. Previous Research
The empirical research on causes of systemic banking crises is quite extensive, and 
any attempt to create an exhaustive review will necessarily be futile. Below we will 
however give a summary of the most influential works the last 20-so years, focusing 
on similarities and differences in the obtained results. We believe the works covered 
represent the scope of the (academically acknowledged) literature on the topic quite 
well, if any important works happen to be left out, rest assured: it is due to 
ignorance, not selectiveness. 
4.2.1. The Multivariate Logit Approach
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (hereafter DKD) have produced a vast body of 
literature on the empirical causes of systemic banking crises, and have since their 
first paper (DKD, 1998) been two of the most heavily cited authors on the topic. 
Their preferred method is, like applied below, a multivariate logit model. They 
construct a binary dependent variable indicating if a systemic banking crisis is 
happening in a country at a certain point or not, and regress this on an array of 
variables using a logistic probability distribution (see below). They exclude 
observations for all crisis years except the first to avoid endogeneity, and cluster 
errors by country. Robustness checks are stated to include yearly dummies, country 
dummies, and variables describing previous crisis experience. For more on their 
method see the next section. Since their first paper their sample and scope of 
variables has increased a lot, and their result have proven to be quite robust. Money 
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supply over foreign reserves, private credit over GDP, lagged growth of private 
credit, inflation, real interest rates and  the existence of an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme are found to positively influence the probability of crisis, while real GDP 
growth, GDP pr capita, growth in terms of trade8, and institutional quality are found 
to have a negative influence (DDK, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002; 2005). In their 1999 
paper they find that financial liberalization (proxied with the abolishment of interest 
rate controls) has a positive effect on the probability of suffering a systemic banking 
crisis, but that the effect is reduced (and even becomes negative) with higher levels 
of institutional quality (DDK, 1999).  In their 2000 article they show how the 
multivariate logit approach can be used to create an Early Warning System (EWS) 
for banking crises by using forcasted values of the explanatory variables to predict 
future risks of banking crises (DDK, 2000). In their 2002 article they show how the 
design of deposit insurance affects its impact on the probability of suffering a 
systemic banking crisis, the higher the coverage the more positive effect, while the 
higher institutional quality, the lower positive effect (DDK, 2002). Their 2005 
review updates their original analysis for a larger sample, their results from this 
paper is included in Table 1, as a comparison. 
Their 2011 article differs from the rest, in that it is not a panel and 
treats individual banks. Through a cross sectional OLS they regress the z-scores9 of 
banks on each bank's and country's average compliance of basel core principals. 
They find little or no significance, while macro economic factors such as interest 
rates and rule of law are significant (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2011).
Eichengreen & Rose (1998) use the same basic framework to show 
how developing countries are subject to changes in fundamentals in the developed 
world. They use a probit instead of a logit, and shows a positive effect on the 
probability of suffering an SBC in a developing country from rising interest rates in 
developed countries, thus indicating vulnerability to capital outflows as a source of 
instability. 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine (2000) use a logit to see how bank-
concentration affects fragility. The effect is initially positive, but when including 
8 Only significant in a few of their studies, see Table x
9 The z-score is de ned as (average return on assets + equity/assets)/(standard deviation of the ﬁ
return on assets). They interpret it as "the number of standard deviations by which returns would 
have to fall (starting from the mean) to wipe out all equity in the bank" (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2011, p. 182)
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relevant controls becomes insignificant. The controls have the same sign and 
significance as most other studies.
4.2.3. The Signaling Approach
Kaminsky (1999) and Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) utilize a signaling approach 
when trying to find a predictor of financial crises for developing economies with 
fixed exchange rates. Through comparing the movement of several macro economic 
variables in two years prior to a crisis, with the movements in tranquil periods, they 
create thresholds of both individual variables and composite indexes, that when 
crossed, signal that a crises is imminent. This approach has the clear advantage of 
lower possibilities of endogeneity, as currency crashes are easily pin-pointed at a 
date, and it allows for using monthly data. However, the generality of the results are 
debatable, as the monthly variations of a small set of variables is likely to have very 
different implications for different countries.
4.2.4 Other Approaches
Klomp (2010) uses a random coefficients logit model, also known as mixed logit, to 
prove that there exists much heterogeneity in the way variables affect the probability 
of suffering a SBC. The approach assumes that there is no covariation between the 
time variant observable variables and the coefficients, and that the coefficients are 
normally distributed around the mean for all countries. These assumptions are 
clearly not likely to be met in this case, but through doing this exercise, he shows 
that there is likely to be much heterogeneity in the coefficients between countries 
(even the coefficients most significant on average are insignificant in at least 60% of 
the cases), he thus argues forcefully towards allowing for more heterogeneity 
through constructing groups of similar countries. This argument is strengthened by 
Van den Berg, Candelon & Urbain (2008), who uses a Kapetanios-approach to find 
optimal clusters in a panel of thirteen seemingly arbitrary chosen countries. They 
show that clustering the countries through a conditional logit improves the with-in-
sample performance greatly.
Caballero (2012) uses a conditional logit model, and a random effects-
Mundlak model, meaning that he, as the only author I have seen, allows for country 
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specific effects. His study shows that a constructed dummy variable indicating if net 
capital inflows are higher than one standard deviation of the moving average 
(dubbed bonanzas) have a positive effect on the probability of suffering a systemic 
banking crisis. This seems to be the effect regardless of booms which he defines as 
domestic credit increasing with more than one standard deviation of the moving 
average (ibid). This indicates that a rapid inflow of foreign capital can cause 
banking crises, even if the domestic credit does not experience a boom. 
Interestingly, his macroeconomic control variables are generally insignificant, and 
except for his boom and bonanza dummies, only a dummy for a contemporaneous 
currency crisis, and some indexes of institutional quality, including a self-computed 
moral hazard index computed using among others deposit insurance, are significant. 
This is not implausible, since including country specific effects is likely to leave 
many previously significant variables insignificant, and since he lags all explanatory 
variables, which is generally not done in the other literature. The work is still a 
working paper, he does not give any information on the percentage of crises and 
non-crises successfully predicted, and there might be some methodological issues as 
the conditional logit excludes all countries which have not experienced a crisis in 
the period (21 of 60), while the RE-Mundlak method for non-linear unbalanced 
panels is rather new (see Wooldridge 2009). More importantly; he does not deal 
with heavy outliers in his sample10 Nevertheless his results are interesting. The 
results imply an asset bubble burst, and that the bubble is driven by foreign credit 
supply rather than domestic credit demand, as bonanzas are significant even in the 
absence of booms.
4.2.5 Comparing Approaches
Davis & Karim (2008) has done a comparative study of the (out-of-sample) 
performance of Early Warning Systems (EWS), thus comparing the validity of 
different approaches in predicting future crises. Clearly this also is an indicator of 
how well the approaches work at finding causes of crises. They compare the 
10 He as one of few authors give descriptive statistics of the variables, showing inflation rates of 
several thousand percent, and equally outrageous levels of depreciation and interest rates. The 
problem is likely to be present in many of the works mentioned, as they do not specify how they 
deal with these values. I however suspect that DDK simply delete the observations, but keep the 
countries in the sample, as using this method on the same sample I get very similar results to them 
(not reported).
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signaling approach to the logit approach through re-estimating models of DDK and 
Kaminsky & Reinhart. An interesting result from their study is that applying 
different sources for their crisis variable yields very different results, they therefore 
use several crises variables to ensure robustness. They unsurprisingly find that the 
signaling approach works better when using a composite index, than when 
considering individual variables. They also find that the composite signaling 
approach outperforms the logit approach for individual countries. However, the logit 
approach is found to perform much better than the signaling approach when 
applying the same EWS to many countries. Thus, they conclude, the logit approach 
is better than the signaling when working on a large number of countries.  DDK 
(2000), all though arguably biased to the issue, also find that the logit approach 
outperforms the signaling approach on a panel when evaluating individual and 
country level bank fragility.
4.2.6 Inequality
When it comes to inequality, very little research is to my knowledge done. The two 
most serious works I have seen is that of  Hockett & Dillon (2013) and Bordo & 
Meissner (2012). The former try linking income inequality to general market 
volatility through ARIMA modeling, but no conclusive evidence is found. Bordo & 
Meissner on the other hand explore the link more underhand. They first do a 
regression linking credit levels to crises, before they regress changes in credit levels 
on changes in top one percentile income shares (from Piketty & Saez, 2003). They 
use changes over five years, because this is where the literature linking inequality to 
crises “seem to be focused”, and because the series are I(1). They find no significant 
results. However, their analysis has several problems, firstly their dependent 
variable is changes in private credit, not private credit as a share of anything, thus 
basically being prone to respond to anything that increases over time. Combining 
this with the fact that changes in GDP and previous changes in credit are controls, 
one can see how that crowds out mostly anything. Their third significant control is 
short term interest rates, which are clearly a mechanism which inequality is 
expected to work through in the theoretical framework. This just proves to show 
how challenging it is to separate underlying causes from channels of influence in 
statistics, especially when the series are unusable in levels due to unit roots. 
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Arguably the best approach would be to do a cointegration analysis, but this is 
clearly more challenging.
Apart from the two works mentioned above little serious research 
seems to have been conducted on the issue. Several reports graph various sources of 
top income shares and periods of crises together to show “the obvious correlation” 
(see among others Atkinson & Morelli, 2011; Thaker & Williamson, 2012). Often 
showing graphs like Graph 1 below, while not showing graphs like Graph 2, also 
below. We will therefore in the following do our best to avoid this kind of anecdotal 
evidence, and these two graphs will be the last we give.
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Graph 1, Crises and Inequality in Argentina:
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Graph 2, Average Number of Crises and Average Inequality in Latin America:
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4.3. Method
Our method of choice is the multivariate logit approach. We chose this because, as 
argued above, it is better than the signaling approach when using a panel. We chose 
it over a conditional logit approach, as the latter necessitates dropping all countries 
without episodes of crises in the period, which induces loss of vital controls. We 
chose it over the RE-Mundlak approach because controlling for country specific 
effects is likely to take away much of the effect of inequality. This is especially true 
for countries with short time-spans, as inequality varies more between than within 
countries. We chose it over the probit method, as the thinner tails of the logit allow 
for more predictions in between 1 and 0. This might seem counter-intuitive, as we 
are interested in predicting either 0 (no crisis) or 1 (crisis), however, in practice 
there are very few episodes of crises for a given sample, meaning that the probit will 
have higher probabilities of predicting a large number of near-zero probabilities 
than the logit. We assume this is also why it is preferred in the literature. 
The method assumes the probability to be given by the following distribution:
P (C i ,t=1)=F (β , X i , t)=
eβ ' X i , t
1+eβ ' X i , t
Where C i ,t takes the value one if a crisis starts in country i in year t, and zero other 
wise (years in crises are dropped). X i ,t is a vector of control variables for county i 
observed in year t. β is a vector of coefficients. The coefficients are estimated using 
the log-likelihood function, being the values that maximize it. They are computed 
using maximum likelihood estimation. The log-likelihood function is the following:
log(L)=∑i=1
n
∑t=1
T
[C i ,t log F (β , X i ,t)+(1−C i ,t) log F (β , X i , t)]
Where n is the number of countries and T  the number of years. 
The coefficients thus tell nothing about the size of the increase in probability of a 
crisis for a given change in the variables. This depends entirely on the value of the 
other parameters. However, the sign and significance of the parameters have the 
regular interpretation. Where a negative significant coefficient tells us that an 
increase in the variable on average gives a significant decrease in the probability of 
suffering an SBC for the country-year in question. As is common practice in the 
literature we cluster errors by country, this is particularly important in our case as 
we use several samples with very unbalanced panels.
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A problem with the specification above is that the coefficients are 
estimated based on the size of the variables in the first year of the crisis, meaning 
that endogeneity could be a major issue. A crisis starting in year t is likely to affect 
variable x in year t. Dropping all years of crisis after the first thus does not remove 
endogeneity completely. The literature in general does not address this possible 
problem of endogeneity, with the honorable exeption of Caballero (2012) who lags 
all explanatory variables. Since we are interested in the underlying mechanism 
creating fragility, the contemporaneous levels of macroeconomic variables are 
arguably noise in our regression, and this approach becomes even more appropriate 
in our case. In fact, as inequality is expected to have a slow effect, and that effect is 
expected to happen through the other controls, even observations for years leading 
up to a crisis can be considered noise. Therefore we, after the baseline regressions, 
usually operate with the third lag of all explanatory variables (or the third lead of 
CRISIS as the dependent variable). When doing this, observations between the time 
of the controls and the end of the crisis are always dropped. We will discuss this 
more when presenting our results.
 To deal with the issue of poolability we will apply regional dummies 
to account for country specific time-invariant effects. We in other words do not let 
the effect from inequality differ between countries. There are several reasons for 
this, one is as mentioned that inequality varies foremostly between countries not 
within, therefore country-specific beta's become hard to estimate for short time-
spans. Another problem is that country-specific beta's necessitate variation in the 
dependent variable within countries, which would drop a large percentage of most 
our samples. An interesting analysis would of course be to find optimal clusters, and 
see how the effect of inequality differs among clusters, but we have chosen to spend 
our time differently. One could also apply a Mundlak-type variation of the 
coefficient between countries, but seeing how we are unfamiliar with this type of 
modeling we have chosen to “keep it simple”. However, we do utilize several 
different samples (based mostly on data availability), which serves as a robustness 
check.
Following the recommendations of Davis & Karim (2008) we also 
control for alternative crises variables for the samples where we have both available. 
As argued by Harding & Pagan (2011) this should always be done, as constructed 
binaries always will be sensitive to cut-off levels. We also systematically control for 
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time-dummies and trends, and the robustness to including them in the specification 
is reported (if not in tables, in text).
4.4. Results
Below we describe the results from applying the logit approach described above for 
different specifications on different samples. The general result is that income 
inequality as measured by the gini-coefficient has a positive effect on the probability 
of suffering an SBC in the future. The effect however seems to be non-increasing 
(or even decreasing) with high levels of inequality. The effect of growth in the gini 
seems to be more important than the general level. The gini looses significance 
when controlling for macro-economic variables in the first year of crisis, or the first 
year prior to a crisis. Only results using the second and third lag of explanatory 
variables are robust. We take this as evidence of inequality working through other 
macroeconomic variables rather than indicating low institutional quality or other 
country-specific effect influencing the probability of crisis. Results are presented in 
tables 1-6. Following DDK (1998, 1999; 2005), cut-off levels levels for successfully 
predicting a crisis is set as a probability of 0.05%. This is done due the fact that 
crises are so rare that the probability distribution necessarily will never yield very 
high probabilities, and higher cut-off levels will give little or no information on the 
fit of the model. DDK also argue that due to the costliness of crises, a probability of 
0.05 justifies taking measures to avoid them. I see this argument as secondary, as 
measures are potentially costly and a large number of false alarms will be given by 
this cut-off.
4.4.1. Baseline regressions
In Table 1 we see the baseline regressions. The aim is to replicate the standard 
modeling of DDK using sample one and the controls most commonly used in the 
literature. Using specification 1 we see that we get similar results to most previous 
works. However, we are not very pleased with the distribution of REALINT, 
INFLATION and DEPRECIATION. They all have heavy outliers, and there are 
observations of over 1000% inflation in country-years not specified as crises. Not 
only is this is most likely a driver of the results, but it also gives a correlation of 
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0.995 between depreciation and interest rates. One could chose the approach of 
DDK (1998) and leave them out, or that of Caballero (2012) and most other works, 
and simply leave them in. Neither are however very satisfactory. Leaving them in 
has it's obvious downsides, and taking them out could cause sample-bias. The 
approach chosen to deal with this is to include the dummy for hyperinflation 
(HYPER), and interact the three variables driven by hyperinflation with both this 
dummy, and the dummy for no hyperinflation (NH). The reasoning behind this is 
that when hyperinflation sets in, the level of the inflation does not matter so much 
(i.e. there's little difference between 50% and 100% inflation). This is supported by 
the results, as the interactions with the hyper-dummy are insignificant (not 
reported). This also deals with the problem of multicolinearity as the correlation 
between the NH interactions drops to unworrying levels (see Table 8), the 
correlation is still high between the HYPER interactions, so the interaction with 
depreciation is dropped (as it is basically identical to inflation). As we can see from 
specification 2 this changes the results quite a bit, and improves upon the general fit 
of the model.
To see the effect of inequality we include the lagged GINI 
(specification 3). The coefficient is negative, indicating a negative effect on the 
probability of suffering an SBC from increasing inequality. The coefficient is hugely 
insignificant, and the sign is opposite of what we would expect. The fit of the model 
does not increase from leaving the gini out for the same sample (not reported). 
There are several reasons as to why one should not interpret this result as GINI not 
having an effect. Firstly, the theoretical part of this thesis argues that GINI will have 
an effect through credit levels. Since credit to GDP ratios are included as a control 
in our regression, there is clearly a risk of this taking away much of the effect. To 
exemplify: if you want to study the effect of depression on weight gain, thinking 
that depressed people eat more, you are not likely to capture that effect if you 
control for calorie-intake. Subsequently the PCRATIO variable poses a problem for 
us. Clearly it is not as big a problem as the example above, because credit to GDP 
ratios do not necessarily give information on unhealthy credit levels. Depending on 
the country, unstable credit levels could indicate different credit to GDP levels, and 
thus our GINI should have some effect, but nonetheless the PCRATIO and 
CGROWTH variables are clearly correlated with unstable credit levels. A second 
problem with our GINI, is that it is expected to have a long run effect. Variations 
from year to year are secondary to the persistent level of inequality in a country over 
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time. This brings us to our third problem; that the variation is much higher between 
countries than within countries, and that having a representative panel thus becomes 
paramount. 44 countries might simply be too little.
Let's try to deal with the first and second problem first. The problem 
isn't only that GINI works through PCRATIO, it also works through interest rates 
and inflation, and even growth is driven by inequality in our theoretical model. This 
could lead to the conclusion that our econometric model is all together unsuitable 
for analyzing the problem at hand. The approach of Bordo & Meissner (2012) is 
arguably better, namely seeing how inequality affects the variables associated with 
fragility. However, as argued above, the problems of spurious regressions 
complicates such an analysis when levels are more important than growth. Anyway, 
simply proving that inequality increases credit levels does not establish a causal 
relationship between inequality and crises, as the unsustainability of credit levels 
depend on several other factors which are also potentially influenced by inequality. 
Therefore we will in the following seek to separate out inequality as a factor within 
the logit framework. 
An indicator on if GINI has an effect through credit is simply 
removing the credit variables from the model. Though crude, it can give some 
preliminary evidence. When doing this (specification 4 – Table 1) the significance 
of the GINI increases some, and the coefficient gets the expected sign. However, it 
is still largely insignificant. 
The second issue of long term versus short term effects, can be a 
reason for the low significance. We must remember that the other variables are 
observations for the year in question, meaning that the coefficients on the controls 
are estimated based on their level in the first year of crisis compared to in years 
without crisis. As mentioned earlier, this gives a possible problem of endogeneity. 
We apply the strategy of lagging explanatory variables in specification 5. This is 
done through changing the explanatory variable to the lead of CRISIS1 and dropping 
the first year of crisis from the sample. The GINI again gains significance, and is 
positive. When we drop the credit-variables from the specification, the GINI 
becomes even more significant and positive, though remaining insignificant. Clearly 
this is in no way conclusive evidence of GINI causing SBCs. Firstly because of the 
lack of significance, and secondly due to possible omitted variable bias. With regard 
to omitted variables the increased significance of GINI can come from an array of 
sources. One obvious culprit is institutional quality (widely thought to be correlated 
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with inequality) but controlling for this using POLITY and FINREF does not change 
the result, neither does controlling for regional dummies (not reported). Again, far 
from conclusive evidence, but an indicator that there might be more to it than what 
was evident from the baseline regression. 
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Table 1, Sample 1 & 2: Baseline Regressions.
Dependent variable CRISIS1 for (1)-(4), all crisis years except the first are dropped
Dependent variable first lead of CRISIS1 for (5) and (6), crisis years are dropped.
DDK(2005) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GROWTH negative*** -0.121*** -0.119*** -0.136*** -0.122*** -0.008 0.020
(0.030) (0.030) (0.041) (0.045) (0.036) (0.038)
GDPPC negative*** -0.097*** -0.103*** -0.104** -0.023 -0.084** -0.018
(0.032) (0.033) (0.044) (0.022) (0.042) (0.021)
M2RES positive* 0.0125** 0.014** 0.014** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
PCRATIO positive*** 0.0109 0.016** 0.023** 0.018**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
L1.CGROWTH positive* 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
HYPER 2.101*** 2.837*** 1.965*** 2.367*** 1.720**
(0.485) (0.515) (0.561) (0.809) (0.687)
DEPINS positive** 0.770** 0.735** 0.941** 0.992** 0.635* 0.619*
(0.335) (0.305) (0.367) (0.388) (0.334) (0.350)
INFLATION positive** -0.000
(0.004)
NH*INFLATION 0.0424** 0.044* 0.023 0.054** 0.034
(0.0173) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.037)
DEPRECIATION positive 0.005
(0.006)
NH*
DEPRECIATION
-0.001 0.011 0.013 -0.015 -0.014
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019)
REALINT positive*** 0.012*
(0.006)
NH*REALINT 0.037** 0.029** 0.028** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
L1.GINI -0.001 0.009 0.015 0.026
(0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023)
Observations 1612 1,657 1,657 899 899 861 861
No of countries unknown 82 82 45 45 45 45
Sample number one one two two two two
Pseudo R^2 0.08 0.110 0.142 0.193 0.155 0.102 0.0760
Chi-squared 248.711**
*
62.21*** 81.80*** 77.66*** 57.86*** 69.12*** 69.65***
% total correct 68.0 82.5 83.7 80.5 82.4 79.3 81.2
% crisis correct 61.0 51.7 60.0 64.9 64.9 63.9 55.6
% no-crisis correct 69.0 83.7 84.5 81.2 83.2 80.0 82.3
Not reported: constant (always negative and significant) and interaction-terms with HYPER (never 
significant).
Credit growth and gini not lagged when lead of crisis is dependent. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
11 Note that the Chi-squared reported in DDK (2005) is computed using Likelyhood Ratios, while 
our Chi-squared are computed using a Wald. Wald is simpler, but less accurate for small samples. 
Since our sample is relatively big, we prefer it. However it renders the values incomparable to 
those of DDK.
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4.4.1. Grouping Countries by Average Gini-Levels
Clearly one can not be content with the kind of indicative “evidence” given above, 
and another approach is needed. Since we are first and foremost interested in the 
persistent level of inequality in the country rather than the short-run variations, we 
can use this to gain observations and deal with possible sample bias. Starting with 
sample one we drop all countries with 6 or less observations on GINI (less than 25% 
of the time-span). For the remaining 69 countries (sample three), we take the 
average of the GINI. Clearly this average has some problems, as several countries 
are missing up to 75% of the observations, and even though within-country 
variation generally is quite low, we risk bias in using the averaged GINIs. To deal 
with this we group countries corresponding to their average GINI values, as the 
probability of misclassification with this approach is significantly lower than having 
a poor estimate of the average GINI. To check if average inequality has an effect we 
carry on to include dummies for the groups of average GINI-levels in our 
regression. We check two group-classifications, one classifying terciles, and one 
quintiles. The dummies are QUITNILEi and TERCILEi, where i runs from 1-5 and 
1-3 respectively, and a higher i means higher mean inequality. The results (Table 2 
& 3) are uplifting, with positive and significant results of higher inequality even 
when controlling for credit, and other contemporaneous controls. When controlling 
for institutional quality (POLITY) our tercile dummies lose significance, but our 
quintile dummies remain highly significant (specification 8). When we control for 
capital openness (KAOPEN) and liberalization in the last 5 years (LIB), they are 
both significant. Same goes for when controlling for financial system regulation 
(FINREFORM). However, there might still be omitted variables driving the results, 
countries with high inequality might have other characteristics that make them 
similar which are not captured by our controls. The obvious example of this is the 
“Latin America effect” reported by Deininger & Squire (1998), where the Kuznet 
relation between inequality and growth vanishes when including a regional dummy 
for Latin America. To deal with this possible problem, we also control for regional 
dummies, but the effect surprisingly becomes more robust (for both groupings). 
The results thus give rather robust evidence that countries with higher 
average gini levels are more prone to crises than the countries with lower inequality. 
The results are robust to including both time trends and yearly dummies, for all 
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specifications. They are also robust to lagging all explanatory variables (gaining 
significance), to including yearly dummies, and to using the alternative crises 
specification CRISIS2.  As the results for the quintiles and terciles does not change 
much with these specifications, the results are not reported here. The results are 
however clearly not robust to including country dummies (or doing a conditional 
logit), since the variation over time is zero.
An interesting result from the quintile specification is that the highest 
group consistently has a lower coefficient than the second highest. This is likely the 
reason for the tercile specification loosing significance in specification 8. The 
difference is not significant, but highly consistent (also for the unreported 
specifications). This could indicate that the very unequal countries have a lower 
probability of crisis than the countries with slightly lower inequality. This could be 
do to the sensitivity of our group specification, and the fact that the very unequal 
countries in general have fewer observations of GINI, possibly overestimating their 
mean, but it could also be due to the very unequal countries having more problems 
with poverty, as poverty is likely to have little or no effect on credit levels (a clear 
weakness with the GINI-coefficient is that there is no way of telling which of the 
two are driving inequality). Furthermore, as argued by Ravallion (2001) household 
surveys, which the GINIs are based upon, have a clear tendency to underestimate the 
income of the very rich, so to look for indicators of wealth concentration we might 
have to look elsewhere. Unfortunately we are using one of the few (and arguably the 
best) internationally comparable datasets on income inequality that exists, and 
indicators of top income shares, such as those of Piketty & Saez (2006) are still 
riddled with incomparability-issues. 
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Table 2, Sample 3: Terciles of Inequality. 
Dependent variable is contemporaneous CRISIS1, all crisis years except the first are dropped
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
NH*INFLATION 0.041*** 0.039** 0.042** 0.038** 0.045**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)
NH*DEPRECIATION -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NH*REALINT 0.030** 0.034** 0.039** 0.048*** 0.036**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018)
GROWTH -0.144*** -0.145*** -0.163*** -0.176*** -0.214***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.039) (0.044)
GDPPC -0.058* -0.034 -0.024 0.014 -0.030
(0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.046) (0.040)
M2RES 0.011* 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.010
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
PCRATIO 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.012** 0.0133** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
L1.CGROWTH 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
HYPER 1.726*** 1.681*** 1.611*** 1.495** 1.371*
(0.471) (0.493) (0.625) (0.649) (0.740)
DEPINS 0.641** 0.708* 0.686* 0.594* 0.680
(0.321) (0.368) (0.386) (0.344) (0.444)
TERCILE2 0.764 0.668 0.945 1.127* 1.008
(0.640) (0.681) (0.635) (0.642) (0.677)
TERCILE3 1.188** 1.074 1.463** 1.671*** 1.622***
(0.604) (0.659) (0.618) (0.611) (0.603)
KAOPEN -0.373
(0.237)
POLITY -0.048* -0.066** -0.062* -0.047
(0.026) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037)
LIBERALIZATION 0.361 0.124
(0.273) (0.225)
FINREFORM -1.387
(1.012)
Regional Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,370 1,257 1,257 1,240 898
No of countries 69 64 64 63 47
Pseudo R-squared 0.152 0.151 0.165 0.177 0.213
Chi-squared 110.2*** 98.85*** 131.3*** 175.9*** 137.3***
% total correct 78.3 74.70 76.0 77.3 75.4
% crisis correct 68.4 61.4 61.4 64.3 68.7
% no-crisis correct 78.5 75.3 76.7 77.9 75.0
Not reported: constant (always negative and significant) and interaction-terms with HYPER (never 
significant).
All effects from terciles are robust to including time trends and yearly dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3, Sample 3: Quintiles of inequality. 
Dependent variable is contemporaneous CRISIS1, all crisis years except the first is dropped
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
NH*INFLATION 0.042*** 0.039** 0.041** 0.038** 0.042**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
NH*DEPRECIATION -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
NH*REALINT 0.029** 0.034** 0.038** 0.041*** 0.035**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
GROWTH -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.166*** -0.181*** -0.221***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.039) (0.045)
GDPPC -0.048 -0.020 -0.008 0.030 -0.010
(0.030) (0.031) (0.036) (0.047) (0.041)
M2RES 0.009 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.009
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
PCRATIO 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.013** 0.015*** 0.018**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
L1.CGROWTH 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.0103*** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
HYPER 1.694*** 1.587*** 1.507** 1.364** 1.142*
(0.464) (0.485) (0.611) (0.620) (0.655)
DEPINS 0.640** 0.738** 0.742* 0.657* 0.803
(0.305) (0.371) (0.405) (0.364) (0.510)
QUINTILE2 1.089* 0.947 0.874 0.972 1.011
(0.617) (0.627) (0.714) (0.676) (0.742)
QUINTILE3 1.446** 1.357* 1.635** 1.834** 1.973**
(0.725) (0.720) (0.694) (0.719) (0.769)
QUINTILE4 2.066*** 2.035*** 2.335*** 2.612*** 2.637***
(0.632) (0.643) (0.653) (0.698) (0.750)
QUINTILE5 1.571** 1.269* 1.854** 2.045** 2.379***
(0.686) (0.747) (0.826) (0.814) (0.875)
KAOPEN -0.388
(0.242)
POLITY -0.062** -0.071** -0.068** -0.048
(0.032) (0.035) (0.034) (0.039)
LIBERALIZATION 0.405 0.157
(0.286) (0.239)
FINREFORM -1.603
(1.062)
Regional Dummies YES YES YES
Observations 1,370 1,257 1,257 1,240 898
No of countries 69 64 64 63 47
Pseudo R-squared 0.161 0.164 0.174 0.188 0.223
Chi-squared 109.2*** 88.03*** 138.9*** 200.4*** 138.6***
% total correct 77.1 75.7 75.8 77.8 75.9
% crisis correct 68.4 66.7 66.7 67.8 75.0
% no-crisis correct 77.5 76.2 76.2 78.3 75.9
Not reported: constant (always negative and significant)
All effects from terciles are robust to including timetrends and yearly dummies. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.4.3. Bigger Sample
CRISIS2 runs from 1970-2011, meaning that using this crisis variable we can 
expand our sample greatly. When doing this, grouping countries by average 
inequality poses a bigger problem, as the within country variation is much larger. 
But this is more of an opportunity than a problem, because i it increases our ability 
to capture the effect from the movement of inequality. To do this, we create a 
variable of the average gini for the past 5 years (MEANGINI). We also create a 
variable for growth in GINI from 5 years ago to the present (GINIGROWTH).
To get a balanced panel covering the whole period, we would have to 
drop a large amount of countries. When using this time-period we therefore allow 
for an unbalanced panel. This is done because the sample bias of excluding 
countries with few observations is deemed higher than excluding country-years 
without observations. We keep all countries with ten or more consecutive years of 
observations (sample four). Clearly there is sample bias, as missing years are likely 
to be correlated with institutional quality, GDP and an array of other factors, but we 
still view the bias as less than if we were to drop all countries who do not run the 
entire sample.
Using this complete sample, and lagging all explanatory variables, we 
get a significant and positive result from GINIGROWTH (Table 4). The result is 
robust to several institutional quality measures, regional dummies, and a time trend, 
but not robust to yearly dummies. The effect from average inequality levels 
(MEANGINI) is insignificant. When increasing lags of all explanatory variables to 
three the result from GINIGROWTH grows in significance and becomes robust to 
yearly dummies, as one of very few variables.
This points towards growth in inequality being more important than 
the level, keeping in mind that the lack of effect from MEANGINI could be due to 
the lower effects from very high levels shown in the last subsection. The result is 
not very sensitive to sample selection. When using only the countries which have 10 
or more consecutive observations up to 2008, the result from GINIGROWTH is no 
longer significant at the first lag of explanatory variables, but GINIINCREASE is 
(see below). Furthermore, GINIGROWTH regains significance when taking the third 
lag of all explanatory variables. Meaning that the growth in inequality over the last 5 
years is a significant indicator on if there will be a banking crisis three years in the 
future. This result is robust to an array of sample selections, also when considering 
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only balanced panels. The results are robust to including yearly dummies, regional 
dummies, institutional quality measures, and to deleting all countries with high 
average standard errors of GINI-estimates (cutoffs of 2 and 3 points were tested – 
not reported). 
The samples used above however allows for GINIGROWTH and 
MEANGINI to be calculated for years with missing information. To check if this 
affects the results, we create a sample containing only years with true observations 
of the two variables, for all countries with ten or more consecutive observations 
running up to 2008 (sample 5). The results are also robust to this specification when 
taking the third lag of all explanatory variables (see Table 5). The results are robust 
to time-trends and all measures of institutional quality, but not yearly dummies. 
However, GINIINCREASE is robust to yearly dummies also in this specification 
(see below).
We are worried that the estimated effect might come from increasing 
stability and general growth likely to be found in developing countries in years 
following conflict, which is likely to be correlated with years of reduced GINI. To 
check this we separate between decreases and increases in GINI. The results 
(examplified in specifications 23-24) show that GINIINCREASE (positive values of 
growth, takes the value zero for negative values) is much more significant than 
GINIDECREASE (absolute values of negative growth, takes the value zero for 
negative values of growth). The results are robust to yearly dummies, and the model 
preforms remarkably well compared to the other models, even at three lags. 
Clearly this can be capturing increasing inequality  in developing 
countries indicating or causing higher levels of social unrest and political upheaval, 
especially in a large panel like sample 4. To make sure we are not capturing such 
effects, we redo the analysis for only OECD countries.
We do this as an ultimate robustness check. Only OECD countries 
with observations on GINI for 10 consecutive years leading up to 2008 are 
considered. This leaves us with 17 countries (sample 6), and 20 episodes of crisis. 
We take the third lag of all explanatory variables. Surprisingly the results are robust 
(Table 6), even to including yearly dummies, which renders all other variables 
insignificant. The result is however quite sensitive to changing the lag of 
explanatory variables, where GINIGROWTH is insignificant at all lower lags.
The results above indicate that increasing inequality could be causing 
the movement in the other explanatory variables towards unstable levels in the years 
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leading up to the crisis. This fits well with our theory, as increased inequality will 
give higher credit growth within the framework. It also fits well with the relative 
consumption argument, where keeping relative consumption levels when faced with 
decreasing relative wages causes household debt levels to reach unsustainable 
levels. 
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Table 4, Sample 4: Growth in Inequality. 
Dependent variable is first lead of CRISIS2, crisis years are dropped
(17) (18) (19) (20)
NH*INFLATION 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.037** 0.031
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019)
NH*REALINT 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.023*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
NH*DEPRECIATION 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
GROWTH 0.011 0.002 0.006 0.005
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027)
GDPPC -0.041* -0.031 -0.033 -0.008
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025)
M2RES 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
PCRATIO 0.009** 0.010** 0.010** 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
DEPINS 0.649** 0.814*** 0.582** 0.550*
(0.271) (0.295) (0.289) (0.329)
L1.CGROWTH 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
HYPER 1.411*** 1.398*** 1.159*** 0.923**
(0.407) (0.406) (0.394) (0.415)
MEANGINI 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.011
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
GINIGROWTH 0.064** 0.061** 0.060* 0.076**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035)
POLITY -0.048** -0.082*** -0.086***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.024)
KAOPEN -0.108
(0.114)
LIBERALIZATION -0.345*
(0.194)
Regional Dummies YES YES
Observations 2,119 2,119 2,119 1,947
No of countries 104 104 104 104
Sample no 4 4 4 4
Pseudo R-squared 0.0547 0.0613 0.0813 0.0931
Chi-squared 73.76*** 77.36*** 112.1*** 113.5***
% total correct 80.30 79.90 79.60 79.60
% crisis correct 42.50 41.30 52.50 52.10
% no-crisis correct 81.80 81.40 80.70 80.70
Not reported: constant (always negative and significant). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5, Sample 5:  
Dependent variable is third lead of CRISIS2, crisis years and two years prior to the crisis are dropped
(21) (22) (23) (24)
NH*INFLATION 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.116*** 0.075***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.032) (0.016)
NH*REALINT 0.047* 0.046* 0.078*** 0.046*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
NH*DEPRECIATION -0.029*** -0.027** -0.008 -0.027**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011)
GROWTH 0.117*** 0.119** 0.115*** 0.125**
(0.043) (0.055) (0.044) (0.051)
GDPPC -0.084** -0.076** -0.051 -0.073*
(0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038)
M2RES 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.041** 0.040***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012)
PCRATIO 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
DEPINS -0.027 -0.113 0.063 -0.094
(0.357) (0.526) (0.522) (0.551)
L1.CGROWTH 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
HYPER 3.089*** 2.821*** 4.585*** 2.817***
(0.652) (0.714) (1.020) (0.718)
MEANGINI -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 -0.007
(0.026) (0.039) (0.033) (0.039)
GINIGROWTH 0.163*** 0.164***
(0.056) (0.059)
GINIINCREASE 0.178** 0.192***
(0.082) (0.066)
GINIDECREASE -0.059 -0.083
(0.236) (0.191)
POLITY2 -0.061* -0.063 -0.062*
(0.035) (0.044) (0.036)
Yearly dummies YES
Regional dummies YES YES
Observations 921 921 53212 921
No of countries 49 49 49 49
Sample no 5 5 5 5
Pseudo R-squared 0.130 0.147 0.232 0.147
Chi-squared 142.9*** 241.8*** 307.0*** 246.6***
% total correct 72.5 74.5 62.7 75.5
% crisis correct 64.4 62.2 86.7 64.4
% no-crisis correct 73.0 75.3 60.6 76.0
Not reported: constant (always negative and significant). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
12 All years with no crisis dropped from this specification, as the yearly dummy will become 
infinitely negative. Results are similar when including dummies only for years with crises.
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Table 6, Sample 6: OECD
Dependent variable is third lead of CRISIS2
(25) (26) (27) (28) (29)
NH*INFLATION -0.035 -0.044 -0.040 -0.108 -0.113
(0.137) (0.135) (0.137) (0.177) (0.228)
NH*REALINT -0.109 -0.098 -0.095 -0.201 -0.236
(0.135) (0.126) (0.123) (0.159) (0.194)
NH*DEPRECIATION -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 -0.024
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031)
GROWTH 0.134 0.101 0.092 0.171* 0.202
(0.087) (0.073) (0.076) (0.100) (0.125)
GDPPC 0.008 0.023 0.024 0.046 0.051
(0.064) (0.066) (0.067) (0.060) (0.063)
M2RES 0.044** 0.044** 0.040* 0.042* 0.040*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
PCRATIO 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.004 -0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
L1.CGROWTH -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.009
(0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
DEPINS -0.874 -0.785 -0.774 -0.993 -1.597
(1.120) (1.204) (1.151) (1.440) (1.456)
HYPER 3.078* 3.008 3.054** 2.438 2.438
(1.689) (1.842) (1.533) (1.622) (1.641)
MEANGINI -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.003 0.015
(0.086) (0.084) (0.085) (0.091) (0.080)
GINIGROWTH 0.331*** 0.284*** 0.261*** 0.241** 0.330**
(0.107) (0.097) (0.093) (0.112) (0.129)
POLITY2 -0.066 -0.074 -0.038
(0.056) (0.055) (0.062)
KAOPEN 0.020 0.076
(0.240) (0.273)
LIBERALIZATION 0.305
(0.596)
FINREFORM 2.882
(2.864)
Observations 431 431 411 370 398
No of countries 17 17 17 17 17
Sample no 6 6 6 6 6
Pseudo R-squared 0.185 0.191 0.188 0.207 0.202
Chi-squared 154.9*** 141.7*** 1470*** 456.4*** 310.3***
% total correct 77.0 78.2 75.9 76.2 78.9
% crisis correct 70.0 65.0 75.0 77.7 88.9
% no-crisis correct 77.4 78.8 76.0 76.1 78.4
Not reported: constant (never significant). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Above we have found clear evidence of inequality being a significant predictor of 
future SBCs. Both the level of inequality (though not strictly increasing) and the 
past growth of inequality seem to be increasing the probability of future crises, even 
when controlling for all relevant controls I could think of. The fact that the effect 
becomes insignificant when controlling for macro economic variables leading up to 
the crises suggests that the effect comes from inequality somehow driving these 
variables, rather than inequality being a proxy for other country-specific factors 
affecting general fragility.
Increased inequality is predicted to increase household debt levels on 
the demand side of credit, and increase credit to the entire private sector on the 
supply side. Within our empirical framework there is basically no way of telling 
which one of the two (if any) are driving the results. However, as we have seen, the 
literature on inequality and credit-ratios is quite extensive, and even though the 
results are disputed, there has been produced much evidence supporting both these 
channels. In other words, the evidence given above combined with previous 
research, points towards inequality affecting banking crises through debt levels, 
both through increasing savings of the rich and increasing the debt of the poor.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this thesis we have seen how existing literature treats the link between inequality 
and financial fragility. We have been proposed a new formal argument as to why 
concentration of wealth at the top can cause fragility and why only redistribution can 
reduce it. We have been presented with new empirical evidence showing a 
significant increase in the probability of suffering a systemic banking crisis in the 
future when faced with increasing income inequality in the present. The results are 
robust to all controls included to deal with institutional quality and other possible 
omitted variable bias, and the effect of inequality has proven to be more robust than 
most other variables when considering a crisis three years in the future. This 
supports the theory of inequality affecting fragility though moving fundamental 
macro economic variables such as credit ratios. 
However we have seen no conclusive evidence to indicate what 
channel the estimated effect from inequality is taking on it's way to systemic 
banking crises, and the effect seems to be secondary to other variables, most likely 
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working only through driving them. Thus controlling the level of these other 
variables directly is likely to be argued as a policy recommendation by many. I 
disagree for two reasons. Firstly because reducing inequality is an obvious policy 
goal in itself based on my personal moral sentiment, and secondly because the 
theoretical framework given in this thesis shows how stability can be secured only 
through some form of redistribution. 
In a time of crisis, the Kalecki-Keynes argument shows how 
stimulation must come through consumption. These last years have shown us how 
consumer debt is an unsustainable way of boosting the economy. All evidence 
points towards the income and wealth share of the very rich being historically high 
in the countries struck hardest by the recent crisis. This, combined with the evidence 
given in this thesis, in my eyes paint a clear picture with regard to policy 
implications. When demand is low while those with much to spend do not spend 
and those who want to spend do not have the means to, something needs to be done. 
When the rich lend money to the poor in order to preserve their wealth, and the 
subsequent crisis comes as a surprise to most, some serious rethinking is justified. It 
seems self-evident to me that the problem is structural, and that relative returns to 
labor need to change. I do not know what more to say.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Samples Used
Sample 1: 
Time-period: 1980-2002 (balanced)
Countries:
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, The Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, 
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Chile, Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon ,Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, 
Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (Republic of) Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, 
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States 
Uruguay and Venezuela.
Notes:
Rwanda and China are dropped. 
Transition years and the two following years for the Euro countries are dropped. 
This is because of the lack of continuity in the depreciation and money supply variables. The WB 
money supply variable post-Euro is not directly comparable to pre-Euro levels, but it is calculated to 
give good international comparability, and the data is arguably of better quality than for many other 
countries, so we chose to continue the Euro-series after the transition period. Following DDK (2005) 
and Caballero (2012), we include countries even though they are clear outliers with regard to 
inflation, real interest rate and depreciation. We will deal with this through the HYPER dummy. 
Sample 2: 
Time-period: 1980-2002 (balanced)
Countries:
Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, 
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Korea (Republic of) , Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela
When including POLITY the Bahamas and Germany are dropped.
When including LIBERALIZATION the Netherlands are dropped.
Sample 3: 
Time-period: 1980-2002 (balanced)
Countries:
Same as sample one, excluding the following due to less than 6 GINI observations:
Dominica, Malta, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Togo, Gabon, Oman, Seychelles, Congo (Republic 
of), Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Benin, Syrian Arab Republic and Chad
Including POLITY drops the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Germany and Iceland.
Including KAOPEN and LIBERALIZATION  drops  Burkina Faso
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Including FINREF drops Central African Republic, Burundi, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, Mali, Guyana, Botswana, Cyprus, Gambia, Honduras, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Swaziland, and Trinidad and Tobago, leaving us with 47 countries.
Sample 4: 
Time-period: 1970-2011 (unbalanced)
Countries:
Notes: 
All countries with ten or more consecutive years of observations on the variables included in sample 
one plus MEANGINI and GINIGROWTH. Where MEANGINI is the average GINI for the last 5 
years, and GINIGROWTH is the growth in GINI in the last 5 years. Both MEANGINI and 
GINIGROWTH are allowed to be calculated for observations missing fewer than 3 lags or leads. 
Azerbadjan, Uruguay, Nigeria, China, Belarus, Rwanda, Vietnam, Guinea Bissau  were dropped due 
to being centrally planned economies and/or outliers. This leaves us with a sample of 104 countries. 
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Country First Last Country First Last Country First Last Country First Last
Algeria 1990 2008 El Salvador 1983 2000 Lithuania 1995 2010 Russian Federation 1995 2010
Angola 1999 2008 Estonia 1997 2010 Macedonia, FYR 1995 2010 Senegal 1995 2008
Argentina 1977 2006 Finland 1972 2004 Madagascar 1980 2008 Sierra Leone 1980 2008
Armenia 1994 2010 France 1977 2010 Malawi 1973 2008 Singapore 1973 2010
Australia 1972 2010 Gambia, The 1996 2006 Malaysia 1972 2008 Slovak Republic 1995 2005
Bangladesh 1976 2010 Georgia 1997 2009 Mali 1993 2009 Slovenia 1993 2010
Belgium 2001 2010 Germany 1990 2007 Mauritius 1978 2009 South Africa 1994 2008
Bolivia 1987 2010 Ghana 1987 2009 Mexico 1976 2010 Spain 1972 2010
Botswana 1985 2008 Guatemala 1975 2009 Moldova 1996 2010 Sri Lanka 1974 2005
Brazil 1990 2010 Guinea-Bissau 1995 2008 Mongolia 1999 2009 Swaziland 1998 2008
Bulgaria 1993 2010 Honduras 1987 2010 Morocco 1994 2010 Sweden 1972 2010
Burundi 1996 2009 Hungary 1984 2010 Namibia 1997 2008 Switzerland 1984 2010
Cambodia 1998 2007 India 1972 2008 Nepal 1980 2007 Tanzania 1992 2004
Cameroon 1987 2005 Indonesia 1982 2010 Netherlands 1973 2010 Thailand 1976 2007
Canada 1972 2008 Ireland 1972 2005 New Zealand 1979 2010 Trinidad and Tobago 1994 2008
Central Afr Rep 1996 2006 Israel 1980 2008 Nicaragua 1996 2008 Tunisia 1972 1996
Chile 1981 2010 Italy 1972 2010 Niger 1996 2008 Turkey 1972 2010
Colombia 1992 2010 Jamaica 1972 2001 Norway 1972 2006 Uganda 1994 2009
Costa Rica 1977 2010 Japan 1972 2004 Pakistan 1972 2008 Ukraine 1994 2010
Cote d'Ivoire 1972 2005 Jordan 1977 2009 Panama 1986 2010 United Kingdom 1972 2010
Croatia 1997 2010 Kazakhstan 1995 2009 Papua New Guinea 1999 2008 United States 1972 2010
Cyprus 1994 2007 Kenya 1972 2008 Paraguay 1994 2010 Venezuela 1972 2010
Czech Republic 1995 2010 Korea, Rep of 1972 2010 Peru 1985 2010 Zambia 1995 2008
Denmark 1972 2010 Kyrgyz Rep 1997 2007 Philippines 1976 2010
Dominican Rep 1991 2010 Lao 1998 2010 Poland 1992 2010
Ecuador 1991 2010 Latvia 1995 2010 Portugal 1980 1998
Egypt 1972 2010 Lesotho 1990 2006 Romania 1998 2010
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̶  Some New Theory and Evidence
Sample 5:
Time-period: 1970-2008 (unbalanced)
Countries:
Notes:
Sample 4 reduced to countries with observations of GINI in at least 10 consecutive years leading up 
to 2008. Only actual observations on GINIGROWTH and MEAGINI accepted. This leaves us with 49 
countries.
Sample 6:
Time-period: 1970-2008 (unbalanced)
Countries:
Notes: 
Sample 5 reduced to include only OECD-members.
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Country First Last Country First Last Country First Last Country First Last
Armenia 1994 2008 Dominican Rep 1991 2008 Macedonia 1995 2008 Singapore 1973 2008
Australia 1972 2008 Ecuador 1991 2006 Mexico 1976 2008 Slovenia 1993 2006
Bangladesh 1976 2008 Egypt 1972 2008 Moldova 1996 2008 Spain 1972 2008
Bolivia 1987 2008 Estonia 1997 2008 Morocco 1994 2008 Sweden 1972 2008
Brazil 1990 2008 France 1977 2008 Netherlands 1973 2008 Switzerland 1984 2008
Bulgaria 1993 2008 Honduras 1989 2008 New Zealand 1979 2008 Turkey 1972 2008
Canada 1972 2008 Hungary 1984 2008 Panama 1986 2008 Ukraine 1994 2008
Chile 1981 2008 Indonesia 1982 2008 Paraguay 1994 2008 United Kingdom1972 2008
Colombia 1992 2008 Italy 1972 2008 Peru 1985 2008 United States 1972 2008
Costa Rica 1977 2008 Korea, Rep of 1972 2008 Philippines 1976 2008 Venezuela 1972 2008
Croatia 1997 2008 Lao 1998 2008 Poland 1992 2008
Czech Rep 1995 2008 Latvia 1995 2008 Romania 1998 2008
Denmark 1972 2008 Lithuania 1995 2008 Russian Fed 1995 2008
Country First Last Country First Last Country First Last
Canada 1972 2008 Korea, Rep of 1972 2008 Sweden 1972 2008
Czech Republic 1995 2008 Mexico 1976 2008 Switzerland 1984 2008
Denmark 1972 2008 Netherlands 1973 2008 Turkey 1972 2008
France 1977 2008 New Zealand 1979 2008 United Kingdom 1972 2008
Hungary 1984 2008 Poland 1992 2008 United States 1972 2008
Italy 1972 2008 Spain 1972 2008
Inequality as a Cause of Systemic Banking Crises
̶  Some New Theory and Evidence
6.2. Descriptive Tables
Table 7, Descriptive Statistics:
Table 8, Correlations:
Regional dummies:
1: Middle East & North Africa
2: Sub-Saharan Africa
3:Latin America & Caribbean
4: Europe & Central Asia 
5: East Asia & Pacific
6: South Asia
7: North America
Source: The World Bank (2013)
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obs. mean st. dev. min max
M2RES 2201 8.289564 13.85161 0.1908626 152.4963
PCRATIO 2201 48.50289 41.74314 0.8152577 250.1187
GROWTH 2201 3.975405 3.819721 -22.93405 26.26858
GINI 2032 38.24483 9.908824 19.7 71.32653
GINIGROWTH 2201 -0.0647323 3.419669 -16.71699 18.58061
CGROWTH 2201 9.291288 19.99754 -75.36097 301.8077
MEANGINI 2201 38.62315 9.932801 19.75496 67.8347
HYPER 2201 0.0345298 0.182627 0 1
NH*REALINT 2201 1.80216 8.00807 -40.88293 69.04538
NH*INFLATION 2201 8.429292 8.309476 -17.63042 49.22587
NH*DEPRECITATION 2201 4.318591 14.20861 -29.3524 153.9479
KAOPEN 2171 0.3504699 1.537108 -1.863972 2.439009
POLITY 2201 5.087687 6.140924 -10 10
FINREFORM 1500 0.5800556 0.2857787 0 1
LIBERALIZATION 2020 0.4364653 0.7804709 0 4.302981
DEPINS 2201 0.4470695 0.4973035 0 1
M2RES PCRA.. GROW.. GINI GINIG.. CGRO.. MEAN.. HYPER NH*RE.. NH*IN.. NH*DE.. KAOPEN POLITY FINR... LIB.. DEPINS
M2RES 1
PCRATIO 0.4095 1
GROWTH -0.1806 -0.0661 1
GINI -0.0892 -0.2946 0.0193 1
GINIGROWTH -0.0172 0.0541 -0.0713 0.096 1
CGROWTH -0.094 0.033 0.32 -0.0517 0.0361 1
MEANGINI -0.0854 -0.3011 0.0336 0.9855 -0.0599 -0.0575 1
HYPER -0.0649 -0.1308 -0.1779 0.1231 0.0381 -0.0976 0.1157 1
NH*REALINT -0.0556 0.004 -0.0017 0.0594 0.1089 0.0857 0.0406 -0.0522 1
NH*INFL... -0.1234 -0.3742 -0.0227 0.1781 -0.0631 -0.1061 0.1885 -0.1862 -0.4051 1
NH*DEPR.. -0.0586 -0.2522 -0.1601 0.1983 0.0084 -0.1341 0.198 -0.0657 -0.1257 0.5611 1
KAOPEN 0.1821 0.528 -0.0145 -0.2793 0.0677 0.0722 -0.2896 -0.1565 0.1145 -0.3789 -0.2845 1
POLITY 0.0395 0.328 -0.196 -0.2673 0.0605 -0.0455 -0.2766 0.0116 0.1596 -0.1288 -0.1216 0.3173 1
FINREFORM 0.0578 0.481 -0.0022 -0.1901 0.1151 0.0716 -0.207 -0.1536 0.1878 -0.3457 -0.2611 0.6765 0.3918 1
LIBERAL... -0.1237 -0.1314 0.0001 0.0944 0.0709 0.0826 0.0834 -0.0125 0.1068 0.0235 -0.0078 0.3071 0.0372 0.1945 1
DEPINS 0.0958 0.2009 -0.0562 -0.2458 0.025 0.0342 -0.2492 0.0429 0.0596 -0.1847 -0.1572 0.2961 0.3688 0.4136 0.0655 1
